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Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in Developing Countries
Binswanger, Hans P. Deininger, Klaus
- 21 Aug 2021
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the impact of economic crisis on the ability of small farmers to resist the political influence of rural elites and urban dwellers and discuss the implications for research as well as for policy advice.
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Abstract: Political outcomes - such as agricultural taxation, subsidization, and the provision of public goods - result from political bargaining among interest groups. Such bargaining is likely to be efficiency-enhancing and growth-enhancing when equally powerful interest groups - aware of the economywide budget constraint and know the economic implications of different policy options - participate, and when impartial institutions are available to enforce decisions. The greater the deviation from these conditions, the greater the potential for efficiency-reducing outcomes, the costs of which will generally fall disproportionately on politically underrepresented or powerless groups. Material conditions of agriculture production - such as spatial dispersion, seasonal work cycles, covariance of risk, and the associated market imperfections - exacerbate the difficulties faced by small producers to engage in collective action. So, despite being generally the economically most efficient form of production, family farmers' ability to counteract the political influence of rural elites and urban dwellers is extremely limited. Lack of independent institutions and clearly defined property rights - and the presence of organizational residues - not only reduce peasants' bargaining power but may also make it more profitable for powerful groups to prefer rent seeking to productive activities. How can these undesirable outcomes be avoided, and how can sustainable policy changes be initiated? Experience indicates that fiscal crises of the state, often triggered or aggravated by an external shock, can cause lasting changes of policies and institutions. By forcing the state to devolve some of its power in exchange for financial assistance to meet its immediate needs, such a crisis can give rise to the emergence of independent legal, political, and economic institutions that are maintained even once the crisis has subsided, External actors that provide resources in terms of crisis and at the same time enhance the scope for politically least vocal parts of civil society to participate in political discourse can have a significant impact on changing policy. The paper discusses in detail the implications for research as well as for policy advice.
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Citations
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Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can It Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits?
Klaus Deininger,Derek Byerlee,Jonathan Lindsay,Andrew Norton,Harris Selod,Mercedes Stickler +5 more
- 10 Jan 2011
TL;DR: The lack of reliable information has made it difficult to understand what has been actually happening as discussed by the authors, which has raised serious concerns about the danger of neglecting local rights and other problems.
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The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization
James Manor
- 01 Mar 1999
TL;DR: The authors examines the origins and implications of decentralization from a political economy perspective, with a focus on its promise and limitations, and explores why countries have often chosen not to decentralize, even when evidence suggests that doing so would be in the interests of the government.
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Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human-capital promoting institutions (e.g. public schooling), and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing to the divergence in income per capita across countries.
Trends, drivers and impacts of changes in swidden cultivation in tropical forest-agriculture frontiers: A global assessment
Nathalie van Vliet,Ole Mertz,Andreas Heinimann,Tobias Langanke,Unai Pascual,Unai Pascual,Birgit Schmook,Cristina Adams,Dietrich Schmidt-Vogt,Peter Messerli,Stephen J. Leisz,Jean-Christophe Castella,Lars N. Jorgensen,Torben Birch-Thomsen,Cornelia Hett,Thilde Bech-Bruun,Amy Ickowitz,Kim Chi Vu,Kono Yasuyuki,Jefferson Fox,Christine Padoch,Wolfram Dressler,Alan D. Ziegler +22 more
TL;DR: A meta-analysis of land-cover transformations of the past 10-15 years in tropical forest-agriculture frontiers world-wide shows that swidden agriculture decreases in landscapes with access to local, national and international markets that encourage cattle production and cash cropping, including bio-fuels.
Agricultural Extension: Good Intentions and Hard Realities
Jock R. Anderson,Gershon Feder +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a framework outlining farmers demand for information, the public goods character of extensions services, and the organizational and political attributes affecting the performance of extension systems.
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