Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors suggest that relative to domestic investors, foreign investors care more about a firm's governance quality and suggest that the B-share price discount is higher for firms that have weaker governance characterized by higher ownership concentration, ineffective boards with a higher proportion of directors appointed by the parent company, lower dividend payouts, and higher levels of information asymmetry.

TL;DR: Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the authors systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.

TL;DR: In this article, the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of boards of directors of state owned enterprises with a focus on infrastructure sectors are discussed, and several policy recommendations emerge from the review of the economic literature and evidence from case studies.

TL;DR: In this article, a two-stage least squares instrumental variable approach is used to further address endogeneity concerns in the model, which is organized into three parts: the construction of the corporate governance indicator, the first stage regression to compute the predicted corporate governance indicators and the second stage regression (ordinary least squares multivariate regressions) to analyze the relationship between related party transactions and earnings management.

TL;DR: In this article, a parameter covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic is presented, which does not depend on a formal model of the structure of the heteroSkewedness.

TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.

TL;DR: In this paper, a covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic is presented, but does not rely on a (possibly incorrect) specific formal model of the structure of the heter-kedasticity.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.