Journal Article10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
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TL;DR: An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics. The article was published on 01 Jun 1995. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation & Equity (finance).
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Citations
Board structure, director expertise, and advisory role of outside directors
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the risk-taking effect of ESOs on firm performance by taking into consideration managers' personal risk aversion, and found that managers focus their concerns more on stock risk and return rather than near-term accounting results.
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Bank Executive Compensation Structure, Risk Taking and the Financial Crisis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the relationship between bank executive compensation and risk taking changes before and during the recent financial crisis and found that a greater proportion of incentive pay decreases the likelihood for a bank to become a problem or failed institution.
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Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States
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References
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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