Journal Article10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
2.4K
TL;DR: An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics. The article was published on 01 Jun 1995. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation & Equity (finance).
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Citations
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The Impact of Financial Leverage on Firm Performance: Evidence from Russia
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References
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
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