Journal Article10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
2.4K
TL;DR: An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics. The article was published on 01 Jun 1995. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation & Equity (finance).
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Citations
Who's Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect Shareholders' Interests?
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TL;DR: This paper found that firms that are defendants in securities litigation have higher proportions of insiders and of gray directors and smaller boards than a matched group of firms that were not sued, even when controlling for firm value and industry.
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Stockholder and Bondholder Wealth Effects of CEO Incentive Grants
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CEO Compensation Structure and Firm Performance
Zoltan Matolcsy,Anna Wright +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance and found that on average, firm performance does not differ between firms offering cash-based compensation only and those using both cash-and equity-based compensations, and that a firm's performance is lower when a firm is using the wrong compensation structure.
Executive compensation incentives, risk level and corporate innovation
TL;DR: This paper explored the innovation of Chinese listed companies from the perspectives of CEOs' compensation and corporate risk and found that executives' salary can effectively promote firms' investment in research and development (R&D), while equity compensation failed to promote corporate R&D investment.
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CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grantsmotivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise using a sample of mergers.
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References
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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- 01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: In this paper, a covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic is presented, but does not rely on a (possibly incorrect) specific formal model of the structure of the heter-kedasticity.
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