Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance

TL;DR: The authors show that stocks can dominate options as a means of motivation only if nonviability risk is substantial, as in financially distressed firms or start-ups, and provide empirical evidence that higher bankruptcy risk is indeed correlated with more use of stock.

TL;DR: The authors empirically examined standard agency predictions about how performance measures are optimally weighted to provide CEO incentives, and found that very little of CEOs' total incentives come from cash pay, and that variation in the relative weight on price and non-price performance measures in CEO total compensation is an increasing function of the relative variances.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine board monitoring when a credible CEO replacement is on the board and find that insiders whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs and their presence is associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO compensation sensitivity to stock performance.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relationship between four corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board independent director, chief executive officer duality and board audit committee) and value of the firm (performance) measures (return on assets, ROA and return on equity, ROE).

TL;DR: In this article, a parameter covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic is presented, which does not depend on a formal model of the structure of the heteroSkewedness.

TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.

TL;DR: In this paper, a covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic is presented, but does not rely on a (possibly incorrect) specific formal model of the structure of the heter-kedasticity.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization, and set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense.