Journal Article10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
2.4K
TL;DR: An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics. The article was published on 01 Jun 1995. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation & Equity (finance).
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Citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors estimate the relationship between long-term corporate investment and CEO incentive compensation structure, while considering the strength of corporate governance mechanisms, and find that longterm business investment is positively related to the weight placed on equity-based incentive compensation, after controlling for internal financing constraints and the quality of the investment opportunity set.
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References
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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