Journal Article10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F
Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
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TL;DR: An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics. The article was published on 01 Jun 1995. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation & Equity (finance).
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Citations
Ownership Concentration and Sensitivity of Executive Pay to Accounting Performance Measures: Evidence from Publicly and Privately-Held Insurance Companies
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the interrelations among five ownership and board characteristics in a sample of 260 bank and savings-and-loan holding companies and found statistically significant relationships between performance and insider ownership and blockholder ownership.
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Estimating the Effects of Large Shareholders Using a Geographic Instrument
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References
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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