Journal Article10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation
1.4K
TL;DR: This article investigated the internal managerial control mechanisms at the disposal of a corporation's compensation-setting board or committee, and concluded that the board creates managerial incentives consistent with those of the firm's owners, both by setting compensation and following management change policies which benefit shareholders.
read more
About: This article is published in Journal of Accounting and Economics. The article was published on 01 Apr 1985. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation & Shareholder.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
Citations
Do Private Firms Outperform SOE Firms after Going Public in China Given their Different Governance Characteristics
Shenghui Tong,Eddy Junarsin +1 more
TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper investigated the differences in corporate governance between publicly listed firms that used to be pure private firms before going public and previously state-owned enterprises before their initial public offerings (IPOs).
11
The effects of privatization on wages and job satisfaction: the case of Ghana
K.F. Asiedu
- 01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impact of privatization on wages and job satisfaction in selected urban-based enterprises in Ghana and found no direct relationship between privatization and overall job satisfaction.
Agency theory, corporate governance and corruption: an integrative literature review approach
Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan
TL;DR: This integrative literature review examines the interplay between agency theory, corporate governance, and corruption, revealing a deepening agency crisis and corruption resulting from concentrated ownership, and highlighting the need for further research on core areas.
11
•Posted Content
CEO and Director Turnover in Venezuela
Urbi Garay,Maximiliano González +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors build a corporate governance practices index for publicly listed companies in this country; the overall results indicate that Venezuela exhibits relatively low corporate governance scores, and they are able to find a positive relation between this corporate governance index and its sub-components and alternative measures of value (Tobin`s q, price-to-book ratio, and dividend payout).
11
•Posted Content
Lower salaries and no options : the optimal structure of executive pay [Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay]
Ernst Maug,Ingolf Dittmann +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 US CEOs and show that the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility.
11
References
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
61.3K
•Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Adolf A. Berle,Gardiner Coit Means +1 more
- 01 Jan 1932
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
10.1K
The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence☆
TL;DR: A review of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control can be found in this paper, where the authors argue that corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.
4.2K
•Posted Content
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
TL;DR: The authors analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level and shows that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme based on individual output levels.
3.9K
Measuring security price performance
TL;DR: In this article, observed stock return data are employed to examine various methodologies which are used 111 event studies to measure security price performance, and abnormal performance is introduced into this data and misuse of any of the methodologies can result in false inferences about the presence of abnormal performance.
3.7K