Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
TL;DR: In this paper, a two-person non-zero-sum game with perfect recall is considered, and an equilibrium is found efficiently by Lemke's algorithm, a generalization of the Lemke-Howson method.
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About: This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior. The article was published on 01 Jun 1996. and is currently open access. The article focuses on the topics: Normal-form game & Repeated game.
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Citations
Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Games.
Gabriele Farina,Tommaso Bianchi,Tuomas Sandholm +2 more
- 03 Apr 2020
TL;DR: In this article, two instantiations of the idea of coarse correlation in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), already defined in the literature, and EFCCE, a new solution concept that was introduced.
The Lagging Anchor Algorithm: Reinforcement Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Information
TL;DR: The article describes a gradient search based reinforcement learning algorithm for two-player zero-sum games with imperfect information, and develops methods for sampling the parameter gradient of a player's performance against an opponent, using temporal-difference learning.
•Posted Content
Efficient Strategy Computation in Zero-Sum Asymmetric Repeated Games
Lichun Li,Jeff S. Shamma +1 more
TL;DR: This paper considers the case of nested information in repeated zero-sum games and studies the computation of strategies for both the informed and uninformed players for finite-horizon and discounted infinite-Horizon nested information games.
•Proceedings Article
Complexity of mechanism design
Vincent Conitzer,Tuomas Sandholm +1 more
- 01 Aug 2002
TL;DR: Focusing-on settings where side payments are not possible, it is shown that the mechanism design problem is NP-complete for deterministic mechanisms and if the authors allow randomized mechanisms, the mechanisms design problem becomes tractable.
The computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen,Peter Bro Miltersen,Troels Bjerre Sørensen +2 more
- 18 Oct 2010
TL;DR: It is shown that it is NP-hard and Sqrt-Sum-hard to decide if a given pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect.
References
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The Linear Complementarity Problem
Richard W. Cottle,Jong-Shi Pang,Richard Stone +2 more
- 18 Feb 1992
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an overview of existing and multiplicity of degree theory and propose pivoting methods and iterative methods for degree analysis, including sensitivity and stability analysis.
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Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
C. E. Lemke,J. T. Howson +1 more
TL;DR: An algebraic proof of the existence of equilibrium points for two-person non-zero-sum games is given in this paper, leading to an efficient scheme for computing an equilibrium point, which is valid for any ordered field.
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Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
TL;DR: In this paper, simple constructive proofs are given of solutions to the matric matric system Mz − ω = q; z ≧ 0; ω ≧ 1; zT = 0, for various kinds of data M, q, which embrace quadratic programming and the problem of finding equilibrium points of bimatrix games.
On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Christos H. Papadimitriou
- 01 Jun 1994
TL;DR: Several new complexity classes of search problems, ''between'' the classes FP and FNP, are defined, based on lemmata such as ''every graph has an even number of odd-degree nodes.''