Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
TL;DR: In this paper, a two-person non-zero-sum game with perfect recall is considered, and an equilibrium is found efficiently by Lemke's algorithm, a generalization of the Lemke-Howson method.
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About: This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior. The article was published on 01 Jun 1996. and is currently open access. The article focuses on the topics: Normal-form game & Repeated game.
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Citations
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Computational Aspects of Game Theory and Microeconomics
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TL;DR: In this paper, a polynomial time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in 2-player noncooperative games is proposed. But the algorithm is based on linear programming duality theory.
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Regret Minimization with Function Approximation in Extensive-Form Games
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Sparse Zero-Sum Games as Stable Functional Feature Selection
Nataliya Sokolovska,Nataliya Sokolovska,Nataliya Sokolovska,Olivier Teytaud,Salwa W. Rizkalla,Salwa W. Rizkalla,Salwa W. Rizkalla,Karine Clément,Karine Clément,Karine Clément,Jean-Daniel Zucker +10 more
TL;DR: This contribution proposes a framework based on a sparse zero-sum game which performs a stable functional feature selection based on feature subsets ranking by a thresholding stochastic bandit and provides a theoretical analysis of the introduced algorithm.
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Multi-Agent Coordination in Adversarial Environments through Signal Mediated Strategies
TL;DR: In this article, a game-theoretic centralized training regimen is proposed to effectively perform trajectory sampling so as to foster team coordination in a zero-sum, imperfect-information game, where each team member's policy is parametrized as a neural network whose output is conditioned on a suitable exogenous signal.
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References
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The Linear Complementarity Problem
Richard W. Cottle,Jong-Shi Pang,Richard Stone +2 more
- 18 Feb 1992
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an overview of existing and multiplicity of degree theory and propose pivoting methods and iterative methods for degree analysis, including sensitivity and stability analysis.
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Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
C. E. Lemke,J. T. Howson +1 more
TL;DR: An algebraic proof of the existence of equilibrium points for two-person non-zero-sum games is given in this paper, leading to an efficient scheme for computing an equilibrium point, which is valid for any ordered field.
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Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
TL;DR: In this paper, simple constructive proofs are given of solutions to the matric matric system Mz − ω = q; z ≧ 0; ω ≧ 1; zT = 0, for various kinds of data M, q, which embrace quadratic programming and the problem of finding equilibrium points of bimatrix games.
On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence
Christos H. Papadimitriou
- 01 Jun 1994
TL;DR: Several new complexity classes of search problems, ''between'' the classes FP and FNP, are defined, based on lemmata such as ''every graph has an even number of odd-degree nodes.''