Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
TL;DR: In this paper, a two-person non-zero-sum game with perfect recall is considered, and an equilibrium is found efficiently by Lemke's algorithm, a generalization of the Lemke-Howson method.
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About: This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior. The article was published on 01 Jun 1996. and is currently open access. The article focuses on the topics: Normal-form game & Repeated game.
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Citations
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Faster Algorithms for Optimal Ex-Ante Coordinated Collusive Strategies in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games.
TL;DR: An algorithm that computes an optimal distribution for a team of two players that faces an opponent in an imperfect-information zero-sum extensive-form game by only using profiles where only one of the team members gets to randomize in each profile is provided.
Nondominated equilibrium solutions of multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum games in normal and extensive forms
Ichiro Nishizaki
- 01 Dec 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the development of studies on non-nondominated equilibrium solutions in multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum games in normal and extensive forms is reviewed.
Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory
TL;DR: A complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory can be found in this paper, where the authors give a detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the Van den Elzen-Talman algorithm.
Optimistic Mirror Descent Either Converges to Nash or to Strong Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Ioannis Anagnostides,Gabriele Farina,Ioannis Panageas,Tuomas Sandholm +3 more
- 22 Mar 2022
TL;DR: For general-sum games, the authors showed that optimistic mirror descent (OMD) with smooth regularization can converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium in O(1) iterations, and that OMD can reach an exact CCE after only O( 1 ) iterations.
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Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games.
TL;DR: It is shown that, for games with two receivers, an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial time thanks to a novel algorithm based on the ellipsoid method which is proposed.
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Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games
C. E. Lemke,J. T. Howson +1 more
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Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming
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