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Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges 1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorials auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed by participants and a central planner as endowments Private values, risk neutrality, and independent types are assumed.
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Abstract: We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorial auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed by participants and a central planner as endowments Private values, risk neutrality, and independent types are assumed Efficiency, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, and Interim Individual Rationality are required We characterize the least upper bound of the central planner’s expected revenue We introduce a stability notion, namely, the marginal core, to the assumption that the central planner’s endowment is unprotected We show that the central planner has a deficit in expectation if and only if the marginal core is non-empty
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Citations
•Proceedings Article
Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions.
Robert W. Day,S. Raghavan +1 more
- 01 Jan 2005
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction and propose a proxy-auction mechanism to solve this problem, and demonstrate the strength of a mechanism that minimizes the total payments among all possible proxy auction outcomes.
134
•Posted Content
Detail-Free Mechanism Design in Twice Iterative Dominance: Large Economies ( Revised version of CARF-F-007(2004) and CARF-F-062(2005); The further revision was subsequently published in "Journal of Economic Theory" as a regular article. )
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment, and demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements competitive allocations with complete information in twice iterative dominance, irrespective of how the environment is specified.
2
•Posted Content
Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design
TL;DR: In this paper, a modified virtual valuation is proposed to maximize the revenue of the central planner under incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the ex-post term, and the optimal position allocation is shown to be maximized through modified virtual valuations.
Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate combinatorial allocations with opt-out types and clarify the possibility of achieving efficiency under incomplete information, and introduce two distinct collective decision procedures, assuming that the central planner designs a mechanism and players have the option to exit.
References
Optimal Auction Design
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
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Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading
TL;DR: In this article, the seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for a single object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
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