Econometric Evidence on the Impacts of Privatization, New Entry, and Independent Industry Regulator on Mobile Network Penetration and Expansion
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the impacts of privatization, new entry and independent regulatory authority on mobile network penetration and expansion using a new and hitherto unused panel dataset for 30 national mobile markets (i.e. 29 OECD countries and China) over the time period 1991-2006 under a 3-equation econometric framework.
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Abstract: This study examines the impacts of reforms - privatization, new entry and independent regulatory authority - on mobile network penetration and expansion using a new and hitherto unused panel dataset for 30 national mobile markets (i.e. 29 OECD countries and China) over the time period 1991-2006 under a 3-equation econometric framework. The estimation results confirm that introducing new entry is, in general, positively correlated with mobile network penetration and expansion; and in particular, the third entry brings many more benefits than the second one. The results also highlight the crucial role of an independent regulator in privatized mobile markets. Especially, the dynamic estimation results suggest that without an independent regulator, privatization is, on average, negatively correlated with mobile network expansion, even in certain competitive market environments.
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Figures
Table 4: Panel Dynamic Estimation Results 
Table 5: Reform Effects on Mobile Price and Labour Productivity 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Mobile Sector Reforms by County 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Cross-Country Trends in Telecoms Performances and Reforms (1991-2006) 
Table 3: Estimations Results by Panel Equation-by-Equation and Panel Instrumental Approaches
Citations
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