Dynamic screening with limited commitment

TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize revenue-maximizing mechanisms in Myerson's (1981) environment when the seller behaves sequentially rationally, in the sense that she cannot commit not to propose a new mechanism if the previously chosen one fails to allocate the object.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a Markov perfect equilibrium, where the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods to increase the willingness to pay of future buyers, but decrease the willingness of buyers who arrive early in the game.

TL;DR: Ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information are studied, finding that when the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors survey recent developments in the dynamic mechanism design literature and then introduce two new areas that are likely to draw attention in the years to come: robustness and endogenous types.

TL;DR: The standard envelope theorems apply to choice sets with convex and topological structure, providing sufficient conditions for the value function to be differentiable in a parameter and characterizing its derivative as mentioned in this paper.

TL;DR: In this paper, a reverse Averch-Johnson result is shown for durable-goods monopolists: if a monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it, or to make binding promises about his future production, such problems are ameliorated, and it is shown that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies.

TL;DR: Using Lagrange Interpolating Polynomials in RLT to measure Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation Technique and other results, as well as new approaches to Tabu Search, a Bayesian approach to MATHEMATICAL MODELS is suggested.

TL;DR: It is shown that a communication equilibrium is a sequential communication equilibrium if and only if it never uses codominated actions, and Predominant communication equilibria are defined by iterative elimination of codominatedactions and are shown to exist.