Dynamic coalitional equilibrium

TL;DR: In this article, the authors adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe (1994; J. Econ. Theory 63: 299-325) to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted.

TL;DR: In this paper, an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default was studied, where in each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy, which is the default for the next period.

TL;DR: The equilibrium coalitional behavior (ECB) as mentioned in this paper is a solution concept, which captures foresight and imposes the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the policies that can be implemented from any initial default in a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multidimensional and infinite policy spaces, and derive conditions under which immovable policies in semi-Markovian equilibria form a consistent choice set.

TL;DR: In Social and Economic Networks as discussed by the authors, a comprehensive introduction to social and economic networks, drawing on the latest findings in economics, sociology, computer science, physics, and mathematics, is presented.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self-interested individuals can form or sever links, and show that there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes, and in different economic environments, with more or less economic integration, focusing on the trade-off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a stronger definition of self-enforceability, and label the class of efficient self-ensforcing agreements "coalition-proof" for non-cooperative games.