Developments in Multi-Agent Fair Allocation

TL;DR: This work takes the group envy-freeness concept that is well-established in the literature and presents stronger and relaxed versions that are especially suitable for the allocation of indivisible items, and presents a clear taxonomy of the fairness concepts.

TL;DR: Polynomial-time algorithms for the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods among agents that have subadditive valuations over the goods and approximation guarantees are essentially tight for XOS and, hence, subadditives valuations are developed.

TL;DR: A comprehensive survey of recent progress through the prism of algorithms can be found in this paper, highlighting the ways to relax fairness notions and common techniques to design algorithms, as well as the most interesting questions for future research.

TL;DR: The authors study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.

TL;DR: Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), a generalization of max-min fairness to multiple resource types, is proposed, and it is shown that it leads to better throughput and fairness than the slot-based fair sharing schemes in current cluster schedulers.

TL;DR: This book discusses three cardinal interpretations of collective welfare: Bentham's "utilitarian" proposal to maximize the sum of individual utilities, the Nash product, and the egalitarian leximin ordering.