Journal Article10.1093/MIND/XCI.363.432
Defeasibility and Memory Knowledge
TL;DR: Carl Ginet has provided what may be the most nearly adequate traditional account of memory knowledge to have come along, by carefully developing a correlative four-part definition of memoryknowledge that p.
read more
Abstract: Philosophers who devise fourth conditions in definitions of knowledge that p should investigate how their definitions might apply to cases where, if the subject did know thatp, that knowledge would be memory knowledge. Carl Ginet has done this.' More than this, by carefully developing a correlative four-part definition of memory knowledge that p, he has provided what may be the most nearly adequate traditional account of memory knowledge to have come along.2 I shall argue that, as a definition, the latter account fails-owing to the problematic way in which it incorporates the fourth condition in his general definition of knowledge.
read more
Chat with Paper
AI Agents for this Paper
Find similar papers on Google Scholar, PubMed and Arxiv
Write a critical review of this paper
Analyze citations of this paper to find unaddressed research gaps
Citations
Justification, sociality, and autonomy
TL;DR: The authors explored the contours of a collectivist view of justification on testimony, with special attention to the place of a subject's intellectual autonomy in such justification, and brought empirical results of the psychology of persuasion to bear on the epistemological issues.
48
The Epistemological Disunity of Memory
Fabrice Teroni
- 01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend the use of Past Reason Theory and Present Reason Theory for different kinds of memory judgements, arguing that the PastRT offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgments, while the Present Reason theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgments.
5
Justification in memory knowledge
TL;DR: The definition of memory knowledge proposed in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject, rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief.
3