Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible

TL;DR: A review of the application of non-kin cooperation in applied evolutionary psychology can be found in this article, where the authors present a review of some of the most common forms of informal help, such as favours, advice, exchange of benefits, restaurant tips, etc.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an experimental test for the principle of legitimacy in the framework of a public goods game, by comparing it with a classic (unrestricted) punishment institution, and find that, despite the lack of additional monetary incentives to cooperate, the introduction of legitimate punishment leads to substantial efficiency gains, in terms of both cooperation and earnings.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the merits of inequity aversion as a theory of fairness and as an explanation of human behavior and suggest an alternative way of understanding the puzzling behavior of humans in economic experiments.

TL;DR: This article found that donors are perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners than non-donors in exchange games, and that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust.

TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.

Abstract: In 1985, the National Academy of Sciences sponsored a conference in Annapolis, Maryland, to discuss common property resource management. This conference was a watershed in the development of the theoretical underpinning of institutional design for successful common pool resource (CPR) management. Since then, an international network of over 2,000 researchers has developed, and the International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP), formed in 1989, has held two successful international conferences. Dominating the intellectual evolution of the field has been the work of Elinor Ostrom, co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. Her book, Governing the Commons, presents a lucid exposition of the current state of institutional analysis of common property problems. Part of the Cam-bridge series on Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, the book addresses how common pool resources may be managed successfully without falling prey to the "tragedy of the commons." Common pool resources are characterized by subtractability (i.e., withdrawal by one user reduces the amount of the resource left for other users) and joint use by a group of appropriators. Thus, a common village grazing field has forage for a limited number of beasts, and all the villagers are entitled to pasture their animals on the field. Community rules of access and management are required to sustain the field from season to season. Problems in managing CPRs arise when the rational individual determines that he will still have access to the resource even if he does not fully contribute to its maintenance (the "free rider" problem). An extensive literature discusses the effect of free riders, concluding that common pool resources will inevitably fall into ruin. One of two solutions is usually offered to avoid this problem: centralized governmental regulation or privatization. Noting the numerous occasions in which common pool resources are managed successfully with neither centralized governmental control nor privatization, Ostrom argues for a third approach to resolving the problem of the commons: the design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users. In Governing the Commons she examines small-scale common-pool resources. Resource user groups examined range in size from 50-15,000 people who rely substantially on the common pool resource for their economic well-being. She has further