Journal Article10.5465/AMR.1990.4309111
Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction Cost Theory
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TL;DR: In this paper, the invisible hand of the market mechanism deletes actors whose behaviors are habitually opportunistic, and thus the risk of opportunism will be low, even for transactions supported by specific asset investments.
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Abstract: Transaction cost theorists have generally neglected to consider the implications that the invisible hand of the market mechanism can have for the risk of opportunism. In the long run, the invisible hand deletes actors whose behaviors are habitually opportunistic. Consequently, as markets move toward the state of competitive equilibrium, the risk of opportunism will be low, even for transactions supported by specific asset investments. Therefore, in many contexts the transaction cost rationale for internalization has been overstated.
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Citations
Beyond Transaction Cost Economics
TL;DR: It is argued that ITO research has matured to the point that it should be building its own endogenous ITO theory, and three assumptions about ITO are offered, in each case, reasons why these may be more appropriate than TCE assumptions.
Curbing Foreign Distributor Opportunism: An Examination of Trust, Contracts, and the Legal Environment in International Channel Relationships:
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used data from a large set of U.S.-based manufacturers to formulate and test propositions about limiting the potential opportunistic behavior of foreign distributors, and found that the joint use of trust and formal contracts is not significantly associated with opportunism.
The interaction effect of trust and contract on dispute negotiation strategy: evidence from the Chinese construction industry
TL;DR: In this paper , the interaction effect of trust and contract on dispute negotiation strategies in contractor-subcontractor relationships was investigated by developing a conceptual framework and conducting a questionnaire survey comprising more than 300 disputes in the Chinese construction industry.
•Dissertation
L'approche stratégique du développement des groupes familiaux : cas des hypogroupes
Imen Mzid
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TL;DR: In this paper, a demarche qualitative analysis of the structure of families in hypogroupes is presented, based on a semi-directif aupres des dirigeants proprietaires of sept cas d'hypogroupe.
The nature, antecedents, and consequences of joint venture trust
TL;DR: In this paper, a conceptual understanding of joint venture trust has been developed, and a framework of the antecedents and consequences of JV trust is developed, including forbearance, governance structures, relationship investments, increases in JV scope, and JV performance.
References
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Robert Axelrod,William D. Hamilton +1 more
- 01 Apr 1984
TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
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