Constrained school choice
Guillaume Haeringer,Flip Klijn +1 more
TL;DR: This work studies the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable and identifies rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or efficiency of either of the two mechanisms.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory. The article was published on 01 Sep 2009. and is currently open access. The article focuses on the topics: Nash equilibrium & Epsilon-equilibrium.
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Citations
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze a model with indifferences in school prefer- ences and empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability and direct attention to some open questions.
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
Fuhito Kojima,Parag A. Pathak +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the scope for manipulation in a many-to-one matching market and show that the fraction of participants who can profitably misrepresent their preferences via truncation is small.
What parents want: school preferences and school choice
TL;DR: The authors investigate parents' preferences for school attributes in a unique data set of survey, administrative, census and spatial data, using a conditional logit, incorporating characteristics of households, schools and home-school distance.
School Choice with Consent
TL;DR: The authors proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) that allows a student to consent to waive a certain priority that has no effect on his or her assignment, but may help many others benefit as a consequence.
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Effective affirmative action in school choice
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the welfare effects of minority reserves and majority quotas and show that minority students are, on average, better off with minority reserves while adverse effects on majority students are mitigated.
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Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting and define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence.
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Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Alvin E. Roth,Marilda Sotomayor +1 more
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TL;DR: The marriage model and the labor market for medical interns, a simple model of one seller and many buyers, and Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences are examined.
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.