Book Chapter10.1007/0-387-27275-5_15
Combinatorial Auctions in Procurement
Wedad Elmaghraby,Pinar Keskinocak +1 more
- 01 Jan 2004
- pp 245-258
161
TL;DR: This paper focuses on price discovery mechanisms, where prices are determined via a bidding process and can be dynamic, i.e., the seller may offer different prices to different customers or change prices dynamically over time.
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Abstract: Making the right pricing decision in sales or procurement is a complex task. While the types of pricing policies/methods used in the exchange of goods and services vary greatly, we can divide these mechanisms under two broad categories: posted price mechanisms and price discovery mechanisms. Under a posted price mechanism, a good is sold at a take-it-or-leave-it price determined by the seller. A posted price can be dynamic, i.e., the seller may offer different prices to different customers (customized prices) or change prices dynamically over time (intertemporal prices). In a price discovery mechanism, prices are determined via a bidding process.
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Citations
Optimization‐based procurement for transportation services
Chris Caplice,Yosef Sheffi +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present the concept of optimization-based procurement for transportation services, which allows both the shipper and carriers to benefit through the use of a collaborative approach to securing and managing a strategic relationship.
231
Robot exploration with combinatorial auctions
M. Berhault,H. Huang,Pinar Keskinocak,Sven Koenig,Wedad Elmaghraby,Paul M. Griffin,Anton J. Kleywegt +6 more
- 03 Dec 2003
TL;DR: Computational results in teambots, a multi-robot simulator, indicate that combinatorial auctions generally lead to significantly superior team performance than single-item auctions, and generate very good results compared to an optimal centralized mechanism.
208
Solutions to the request reassignment problem in collaborative carrier networks
TL;DR: In this article, the authors considered an arrangement for exchanging transportation requests to facilitate collaboration among independent carriers, and two solution approaches were developed for this problem involving decentralized control and auction based exchange mechanisms.
176
Multiple‐buyer procurement auctions framework for humanitarian supply chain management
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a reconfigurable procurement auctions-based framework for disaster relief procurement operations, which includes the announcement construction, bid construction and bid evaluation phases, and verify the framework by simulation and optimization techniques using the system characteristics of the disaster relief environment as an input.
128
Balancing task allocation in multi-robot systems using K-means clustering and auction based mechanisms
TL;DR: A methodology for the real time (NP Hard) multi-robot task allocation problem which includes clustering and auction based mechanism is proposed which reduces computational complexity and provides better solution quality.
124
References
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
TL;DR: In this article, Klemperer et al. provide an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of determining the revenue maximizing set of nonconflicting bids can be solved for combinational auctions where the value of assets to a bidder depends on which other assets he or she wins.
A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation
TL;DR: Grether, Isaac, and Plott as discussed by the authors proposed an auction-based approach for the allocation of slots at four major airports (La Guardia, Washington National, Kennedy International, and O'Hare International).
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•Posted Content
Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions
TL;DR: It is shown that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism, and another scheme is introduced that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players.