Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?

Question

1. What are the contributions in "Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: do both disease and cure depend on the politics of the beholder?" ?

2. What factors were used to identify liberal egalitarians?

3. What were the upset about the executive who kept in place a profit-maximizing scheme?

4. What was the reason that the libertarians gravitated toward the shareholder model?

Accepted Answer

This paper found that conservative managers with strong preferences for cognitive closure were more likely to defend simple heuristic-driven `` errors '' such as over-attribution and over-confidence and warn of the mirror-image mistakes of failing to hold people accountable and diluting sound policies with “ irrelevant ” side-objectives.

Accepted Answer

Liberal egalitarians were identified as individuals with low scores on the market libertarianismfactor and low scores on the authoritarian-conservatism factor.

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”Liberal egalitarians were also most upset about the executive who kept in place apremium policy that boosted profits but hurt the poor whereas libertarians and traditional conservatives were least bothered.

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Conservatives and libertarians gravitated toward the shareholder model largely for the ideologically correct reason (the primacy of property rights--shareholders are owners of the corporation and managers are their agents).

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Conservatives also believed that lack of will power and of commitment to principles are common human failings whereas anti-authoritarian egalitarians believed that an unwillingness to entertain self-critical thoughts and to re-examine basic assumptions are common human failings.

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Traditional conservatives and their high-preference-for-cognitive-closure allies approve of managers who communicate their policy preferences clearly to subordinates and approve of subordinates who respond equally decisively whereas low scorers on these scales see advantages in encouraging open, balanced debate, and cultivating an atmosphere of normative ambiguity that keeps coworkers guessing--at least for a while.

Accepted Answer

Radical individualists, with their dislike of rule-bound systems that constrain individualinitiative, were harshest in their evaluations of the process-accountability manager (“he personifies what was wrong with the old approach to running businesses” and “that’s how you get $1000 toilet seats”) and most favorable to the outcome-accountability manager (“who pays the people working for him the highest compliment: they are smart and they should use their smarts”).

Accepted Answer

The tendency to prefer dispositional explanations for conduct, perhaps especially undesirable conduct, may derive not from their deficiencies as intuitive psychologists, but rather from a principled or calculated decision by many people (in the functionalist role of intuitive prosecutors) that one of the best ways to pressure other people to live up to performance expectations is to convey that one has a low perceptual threshold for drawing inferences about character from conduct.

Accepted Answer

He responds [by trying to distribute the burden of the cuts fairly and equally across all employees who work for him] [by trying to maximize the efficiency of his organization--laying off those employees who contribute the least to productivity and streamlining operations by introducing new technology that reduces the need for future hiring].

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Modern libertarians, by contrast, stood out as the stoutest defenders of outcome accountability and the most critical of precess accountability -- which they disparaged as “just more bureaucracy” and “rules for the sake of rules.

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Partial correlational analysis suggested that this effect was partly rooted in the belief that people are rudder-less without strong leadership.

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Those more sympathetic to protracted cognitive assessments were equipped with fewer snappy aphorisms but the gist of their comments was plain enough: “Learn to live with uncertainty” and “As soon as you stop hearing that little voice in the back of your mind saying ‘you might be wrong,’ you are definitely in trouble.”

Accepted Answer

Thesecleavages in managers’ intuitive theories of decision-making thus mirror themes in the now vast literature on contingency theories of social cognition and decision making (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) and the ongoing controversy over when simple heuristics generate as accurate assessments and as utility-enhancing decisions as do more complex and effort-demanding methods of making up one’s mind (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999).

Accepted Answer

The few libertarians who thought the company should recall the cars with the potential defect did so not on the ground it was immoral to monetize life (a taboo trade-off--Tetlock et al, 1996), but rather on the ground that the company may not have been fully honest with its customers about the risks to their safety and thus prevented the customers from making money-life trade-offs of their own.

Accepted Answer

libertarians were more positive in their evaluations of the executive who retained the profit-maximizing scheme (‘He was honoring his responsibilities to his firm and to the shareholders, not pandering to political pressure groups.

Accepted Answer

But libertarians had a much more positive reaction to the exit response (competent individuals exercising choices in self-correcting labor markets) than did the traditional conservatives who saw the same conduct as rather opportunistic.

Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?

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Most frequently asked questions

1. What are the contributions in "Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: do both disease and cure depend on the politics of the beholder?" ?

2. What factors were used to identify liberal egalitarians?

3. What were the upset about the executive who kept in place a profit-maximizing scheme?

4. What was the reason that the libertarians gravitated toward the shareholder model?

5. What do conservatives think of the lack of will power and commitment to principles?

6. What scales of the conservatives view simplicity as evidence of insight?

7. What were the favorable attitudes to the outcome-accountability manager?

8. What is the tendency to prefer dispositional explanations for conduct?

9. What is the simplest example of a manager who is trying to maximize the efficiency of his?

10. What was the critical of precess accountability?

11. What was the effect of partial correlation analysis?

12. What was the gist of the comments?

13. What are the main themes of managers’ intuitive theories of decision-making?

14. Why did some managers think they should recall cars with the potential defect?

15. What were the positive evaluations of the executive who retained the profit-maximizing scheme?

16. What did traditional conservatives think of the exit response?

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References

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk

Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk

Handbook of social psychology

A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice

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