Best Practices for Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: A Principal-Agent Perspective

TL;DR: In this article, evolutionary pathways for water quality policies in relation to changing pollution events and socio-political system changes in Oregon, USA, and South Korea were examined, despite geographic and temp...

TL;DR: In this paper , the mediating effect of central environmental protection inspectors on firms' environmental governance behavior was examined using a double difference model with the help of a quasi-natural experiment, the new Environmental Protection Law.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use a synthetic control technique to determine how actual CWA program outcomes in five states compare to expected outcomes if EPA retained primary authority, and conclude that primacy has asymmetrical impacts that largely depend on state implementation systems, which carries important implications for environmental federalism.

TL;DR: The regional institutional environment of China’s transitional economy significantly influences the relationship between a firm’s R&D investment intensity and innovation performance.

TL;DR: This model reconciles two approaches to policy implementation by concentrating on the theoretical significance of ambiguity and conflict for policy implementation, and four policy implementation paradigms are identified and the relevance of the existing literature to these conditions is discussed.

TL;DR: A summary of the theoretical development and the empirical findings from the authors' research on the dimensions and impact of the hollow state in the domain of health and human services contracting can be found in this paper.

TL;DR: The principal-agent theory has been used to model the role of information asymmetry and incentives in political relationships as discussed by the authors, and it has been applied to the problem of credible commitment.

TL;DR: The authors examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations and find responsiveness in all seven cases, indicating that political appointments are the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important.