Journal Article10.1016/0304-4068(82)90007-6
Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
TL;DR: In this paper, the problem of correct revelation is studied as a game with incomplete information where players have individual beliefs concerning other's types and general conditions on the beliefs are given which are shown to be sufficient for the existence of a Pareto-efficient mechanism for which truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Mathematical Economics. The article was published on 01 Jun 1982. The article focuses on the topics: Complete information & Incentive compatibility.
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Citations
Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions
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References
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I-III
TL;DR: The paper develops a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc.
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
TL;DR: This paper examined the consequences of basing mixed strategies on subjective random devices, i.e. devices on the probabilities of whose outcomes people may disagree (such as horse races, elections, etc.).
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
TL;DR: In this paper, a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information has been described, and it has been shown that in consistent games, where a basic probability distribution exists, it is essentially unique.
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Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
TL;DR: In this article, it has been shown that any game with incomplete information is equivalent to a game with complete information, called the "Bayes-equivalent" of the original game or briefly a "Bayesian game".
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Incentives and incomplete information
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of correct revelation in a collective decision model is presented as a game with incomplete information, and two approaches to incomplete information are used, a first where the individual beliefs are not introduced and a second where they are.
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