ANALYZING ENCRYPTION PROTOCOLS USING FORMAL VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES (Extended Abstract)
Richard A. Kemmerer
- 16 Aug 1987
- pp 289-305
TL;DR: In contrast, very little work has been devoted to the analysis and formal verification of encryption protocols, such as DES as discussed by the authors, except for a few papers devoted to formal verification and analysis of encryption algorithms.
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Abstract: Much work has been done in the area of analyzing encryption algorithms, such as DES [Dav 81.Bri 85.BMP 861]. A vast amount of work has also been expended on formally verifying com- munication protocols [IEE 82,STE 82,RW 83.LS 84.Hol 871]. In contrast, very little work has been devoted to the analysis and formal verification of encryption protocols.
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Citations
A formal approach to security architectures
Rainer A. Rueppel
- 08 Apr 1991
TL;DR: A formal language whose symbols are security goals and mechanisms is defined, which allows every security architecture to be expressed as a string and allows us to identify complexity- reducing and complexity-increasing mechanisms.
References
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Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto 84
George Robert Blakley,David Chaum +1 more
- 01 Nov 1985
TL;DR: Some Public-Key Crypto-Functions as Intractable as Factorization as well as Cryptosystems and Other Hard Problems.
632
Protocol specification, testing, and verification
TL;DR: Carl Sunshine is with the University of Southern California Information Sciences Institute where he is engaged in research on computer networks and their protocols, particularly interested in protocol design, modeling, and analysis, and network interconnection.
303
The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis
TL;DR: The Interrogator is a Prolog program that searches for security vulnerabilities in network protocols for automatic cryptographic key distribution, and has been able to rediscover a known vulnerability in a published protocol.
228
Testing Formal Specifications to Detect Design Errors
TL;DR: Why it is necessary to test specifications early in the software life cycle to guarantee a system that meets its critical requirements and that also provides the desired functionality is demonstrated.
Breaking iterated knapsacks
Ernest F. Brickell
- 23 Aug 1985
TL;DR: An outline of an attack that is used successfully to break iterated knapsacks is presented, although it is not provided that the attack almost always works.