Journal Article10.1109/49.17707
Analyzing encryption protocols using formal verification techniques
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TL;DR: In this paper, an approach to analyzing encryption protocols using machine-aided formal verification techniques is presented, where the properties that the protocol should preserve are expressed as state invariants, and the theorems that must be proved to guarantee that the cryptographic facility satisfies the invariants are automatically generated by the verification system.
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Abstract: An approach to analyzing encryption protocols using machine-aided formal verification techniques is presented. The properties that the protocol should preserve are expressed as state invariants, and the theorems that must be proved to guarantee that the cryptographic facility satisfies the invariants are automatically generated by the verification system. A formal specification of an example system is presented, and several weaknesses that were revealed by attempting to verify and test the specification formally are discussed. >
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Citations
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Martín Abadi,Andrew D. Gordon +1 more
TL;DR: The spi calculus is introduced, an extension of the pi calculus designed for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols and state their security properties in terms of coarse-grained notions of protocol equivalence.
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
TL;DR: Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions, which are based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems.
The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
TL;DR: In this paper, a model spy knows some private keys and can forge messages using components decrypted from previous traffic, and the human effort required to analyze a protocol can be as little as a week or two, yielding a proof script that takes a few minutes to run.
866
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Martín Abadi,Phillip Rogaway +1 more
TL;DR: This paper starts to bridge the gap between two distinct, rigorous views of cryptography by providing a computational justification for a formal treatment of encryption.
627
•Journal Article
Reconciling Two Views of Cryptography (The Computational Soundness of Formal Encryption)
Martín Abadi,Phillip Rogaway +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a computational justification for a formal treatment of encryption, by providing a computational model that considers complexity and probability of a cryptosystem's security properties.
392
References
On the security of public key protocols
Danny Dolev,Andrew Chi-Chih Yao +1 more
TL;DR: Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely, and algorithms and characterizations that can be used to determine protocol security in these models are given.
Reflections on trusting trust
TL;DR: To what extent should one trust a statement that a program is free of Trojan horses?
579
Social processes and proofs of theorems and programs
TL;DR: It is argued that formal verifications of programs will not play the same key role in the development of computer science and software engineering as proofs do in mathematics because of the absence of continuity, inevitability of change, and the complexity of specification of significantly many real programs.
•Book
Reflections on trusting trust
Ken Thompson
- 01 Aug 1990
TL;DR: To what extent should one trust a statement that a program is free of Trojan horses? as discussed by the authors suggests that it is more important to trust the people who wrote the software, rather than the statement itself.
363
The Interrogator: Protocol Secuity Analysis
TL;DR: The Interrogator is a Prolog program that searches for security vulnerabilities in network protocols for automatic cryptographic key distribution, and has been able to rediscover a known vulnerability in a published protocol.
228