Open AccessBook
An Introduction to Auction Theory
Flavio M. Menezes,Paulo Klinger Monteiro +1 more
- 04 Nov 2004
198
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games, and derive a general version of the revenue equivalence theorem and characterize the optimal auction.
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Abstract: This book presents an in-depth discussion of the auction theory. It introduces the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the idea of studying auctions as games. Private, common, and affiliated values models and multi-object auction models are described. A general version of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem is derived and the optimal auction is characterized to relate the field of mechanism design to auction theory.(Publisher website)
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Citations
Equilibria existence and characterization in auctions: achievements and open questions
TL;DR: A survey of single-object auctions can be found in this article, where the standard assumptions underlying these results, and the suitability of the Nash equilibrium solution concept are discussed, are discussed.
13
A Theory of Auto Ownership Rationing
Zhi-Chun Li,Qiao-Yu Wu,Hai Yang +2 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provided a theoretical analysis of three alternative auto ownership rationing schemes, including lottery, auction and the hybrid scheme, for determining the optimal auto quota for these schemes and the optimal proportion allocated to the lottery and auction, respectively.
13
Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider sequential auctions with synergies where one player wants two objects and the remaining players want one object each and show that expected prices may not necessarily decrease as predicted by Branco [Econ. Lett. 54 (1997) 159].
13
The economics of procurement contract awarding: problems and solutions in theory and practice
Pier Angelo Mori,Nicola Doni +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review some of the newest and most promising advances in auction theory with an eye to applications to procurement practice, focusing in particular on four topics related to multidimensional auctions: 1) how to define a proper scoring rule when the awarding bodies lack the necessary information regarding its own preferences and suppliers' technology.
12
Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that in a private value multi-unit uniform-price auction, the reservation price increases both the efficiency and revenue, while the difference between the true value of a unit and the submitted bid (shading) is different for each unit; therefore, the seller cannot allocate units efficiently.
References
Optimal Auction Design
TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
7K
A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
Paul Milgrom,Robert J. Weber +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
•Book
A course in probability theory
Kai Lai Chung
- 01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This edition of A Course in Probability Theory includes an introduction to measure theory that expands the market, as this treatment is more consistent with current courses.
3.1K
Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs
David P. Baron,Roger B. Myerson +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator, and derive an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm.
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
TL;DR: In this article, Klemperer et al. provide an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.