Book Chapter10.1007/978-981-99-8184-7_26
An Attack Entity Deducing Model for Attack Forensics
Tao Jiang,Junjiang He,Tao Li,Wenbo Fang,Wenshan Li,Cen Tang +5 more
TL;DR: An attack entity deduction model for attack forensics leveraging auxiliary strategies and dynamic word embeddings achieves high accuracy in recovering key attack steps and constructing attack stories.
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Abstract: The forensics of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks, known for their prolonged duration and utilization of multiple attack methods, require extensive log analysis to discern their attack steps. Facing the massive amount of data, researchers have increasingly turned to extended machine learning methods to enhance attack forensics. However, the limited number of attack samples used for training and the inability of the data to accurately represent real-world scenarios pose significant challenges. To address these issues, we propose ASAI, an attack deduction model that leverages auxiliary strategies and dynamic word embeddings. Firstly, ASAI tackles the problem of data imbalance through a sequence sampling method enhanced by a custom auxiliary strategy. Subsequently, the sequences are transformed into dynamic vectors using dynamic word embedding. The model is trained to capture the spatio-temporal characteristics of entities under diverse contextual conditions by employing these dynamic vectors. In this paper, ASAI is evaluated using ten real-world APT attacks executed within an actual virtual environment. The results demonstrate ASAI's ability to successfully recover the key steps of the attacks and construct attack stories, achieving an impressive F1 score of up to 99.70%-a significant 16.98% improvement over the baseline which uses one-hot embedding after resample.
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References
HOLMES: Real-Time APT Detection through Correlation of Suspicious Information Flows
Sadegh M. Milajerdi,Rigel Gjomemo,Birhanu Eshete,R. C. Sekar,V. N. Venkatakrishnan +4 more
- 19 May 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present HOLMES, a system that implements a new approach to the detection of Advanced and persistent Threats (APTs), inspired by several case studies of real-world APTs that highlight some common goals of APT actors.
426
NoDoze: Combatting Threat Alert Fatigue with Automated Provenance Triage
Wajih Ul Hassan,Shengjian Guo,Ding Li,Zhengzhang Chen,Kangkook Jee,Zhichun Li,Adam Bates +6 more
- 01 Feb 2019
TL;DR: NODOZE generates alert dependency graphs that are two orders of magnitude smaller than those generated by traditional tools without sacrificing the vital information needed for the investigation, and decreases the volume of false alarms by 84%, saving analysts’ more than 90 hours of investigation time per week.
Log2vec: A Heterogeneous Graph Embedding Based Approach for Detecting Cyber Threats within Enterprise
Fucheng Liu,Yu Wen,Zhang Dongxue,Xihe Jiang,Xinyu Xing,Dan Meng +5 more
- 06 Nov 2019
TL;DR: This work proposes log2vec, a heterogeneous graph embedding based modularized method that remarkably outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, such as deep learning and hidden markov model (HMM), and shows its capability to detect malicious events in various attack scenarios.
261
Tactical Provenance Analysis for Endpoint Detection and Response Systems
Wajih Ul Hassan,Adam Bates,Daniel Marino +2 more
- 18 May 2020
TL;DR: An effort to bring the benefits of data provenance to commercial EDR tools by introducing the notion of Tactical Provenance Graphs (TPGs) that, rather than encoding low-level system event dependencies, reason about causal dependencies between EDR-generated threat alerts.
204
You Are What You Do: Hunting Stealthy Malware via Data Provenance Analysis.
Qi Wang,Wajih Ul Hassan,Ding Li,Kangkook Jee,Xiao Yu,Kexuan Zou,Junghwan Rhee,Zhengzhang Chen,Wei Cheng,Carl A. Gunter,Haifeng Chen +10 more
- 01 Jan 2020
TL;DR: The insight behind the PROVDETECTOR approach is that although stealthy malware attempts to blend into benign processes, the malicious behaviors inevitably interact with the underlying operating system (OS), which will be exposed to and captured by provenance monitoring.
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