Journal Article10.1016/0165-4896(87)90034-5
About extreme equilibrium points
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TL;DR: In this article, some characterizations for the equilibrium points of the n-person games introduced by Marchi and Quintas (1983) are given These obtained using some results given by Kuhn (1961)
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About: This article is published in Mathematical Social Sciences. The article was published on 01 Jun 1987. The article focuses on the topics: Equilibrium point.
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Citations
Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points
TL;DR: In this article, the uniqueness conditions for games with prefixed equilibrium points in the mixed extension were studied and a wide class of games with unique arbitrary prefixed equilibria were obtained.
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Constructing q-cyclic games with unique prefixed e quilibrium
Sara Aida Alaniz,Luis Guillermo Quintas +1 more
- 30 Jul 2013
TL;DR: In this article, a wide family of q-cyclic n-person games with unique prefixed Nash equilibrium points was constructed, with each player having n strategies, being only m (m) strategies.
Measuring and Influencing Sequential Joint Agent Behaviours
Peter A Raffensperger
- 01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: This work proposes a real-valued metric for turn-taking and constructs a reward function such that a particular joint behaviour is the unique Nash equilibrium of a stochastic game, provided that such a reward functions exists.
References
Equilibrium points in n-person games
TL;DR: A concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple ofpure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player.
Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games
TL;DR: In this article, the Lemke and Howson algorithm for finding an equilibrium of a 2-person game is extended to provide a constructive procedure for finding a n-person equilibrium by finding in succession an equilibrium for each of certain related k-person games.
An algorithm for equilibrium points in bimatrix games.
TL;DR: The proof of Lemma 1 is bagbd on the fact that 7rn+3(S5) is cyclic of order 24 for n > 5 in any regular neighborhoods of K in M.
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