Journal Article10.1006/JETH.1998.2469
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
Michel Balinski,Tayfun Sönmez +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new class of matching problems that models centralized college admissions via standardized tests is presented, and the allocation mechanism that is used in real-life applications of this problem in Turkey is analyzed.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory. The article was published on 01 Jan 1999.
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Citations
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
Parag A. Pathak,Tayfun Sönmez +1 more
TL;DR: The authors analyzed the preference revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response, and characterized the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes as a set of stable matchings of a modified economy.
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
Haluk Ergin,Tayfun Sönmez +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors characterize the Nash equilibria of the induced preference revelation game and show that a transition from the Boston mechanism to the student-optimal stable mechanism would lead to unambiguous efficiency gains.
384
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
TL;DR: The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions.
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Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
TL;DR: The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions.
348
Constrained school choice
Guillaume Haeringer,Flip Klijn +1 more
TL;DR: This work studies the preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number of schools to be acceptable and identifies rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability or efficiency of either of the two mechanisms.
338
References
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
David Gale,Lloyd S. Shapley +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the relationship between college admission and the stability of marriage in the United States, and found that college admission is correlated with the number of stable marriages.
•Book
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Alvin E. Roth,Marilda Sotomayor +1 more
- 01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: The marriage model and the labor market for medical interns, a simple model of one seller and many buyers, and Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences are examined.
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The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
TL;DR: The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951, and the record of these changes and the problems that prompt them can be found in this paper.
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
TL;DR: The main focus of this paper is on determining the extent to which matching procedures can be designed which give agents the incentive to honestly reveal their preferences, and which produce stable matches.
Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems
TL;DR: Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems as mentioned in this paper were used to solve the problem of house allocation in a house allocation problem in the 1990s.
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