A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods - experimental evidence
TL;DR: In this paper, a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods is presented. But the results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising.
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Abstract: The author reports on a series of experiments designed to investigate the factor of incentive mechanisms in the case of private provisions of public goods. In the Control treatment, there was no mechanism so that subjects faced strong free-riding incentives. In the so-called Falkinger mechanism treatment, the author implemented the Falkinger mechanism. The studies explored the impact of the mechanism in different economic environments. Results showed that the proposed incentive mechanism is very promising. Section I of the paper introduces the mechanism to be examined. Section II discusses the experimental design. Empirical results are provided in Section III, and Section IV interprets these results followed by a summary.
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Citations
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z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation
Ernst Fehr,Klaus M. Schmidt +1 more
TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.