Journal Article10.1006/JETH.2000.2710
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
Anna Bogomolnaia,Hervé Moulin +1 more
932
TL;DR: A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: the solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set, and Random priority orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object.
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About: This article is published in Journal of Economic Theory. The article was published on 01 Oct 2001. The article focuses on the topics: Central element.
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Citations
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
TL;DR: This paper proposed a combinatorial assignment mechanism based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together, and the mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets.
815
The combinatorial assignment problem: approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
Eric Budish
- 14 May 2010
TL;DR: A solution to the combinatorial assignment problem by proposing two new criteria of outcome fairness, the maximin share guarantee and envy bounded by a single good, which weaken well-known criteria to accommodate indivisibilities and formalize why dictatorships are unfair.
The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Ioannis Caragiannis,David Kurokawa,Hervé Moulin,Ariel D. Procaccia,Nisarg Shah,Junxing Wang +5 more
- 21 Jul 2016
TL;DR: It is proved that the maximum Nash welfare solution selects allocations that are envy free up to one good --- a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency.
Handbook of Computational Social Choice
TL;DR: This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively and offers detailed introductions to each of the field's major themes.
References
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Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
Alvin E. Roth,Marilda Sotomayor +1 more
- 01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: The marriage model and the labor market for medical interns, a simple model of one seller and many buyers, and Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences are examined.
2.3K
On cores and indivisibility
TL;DR: In this paper, an economic model of trading in commodities that are inherently indivisible, like houses, is investigated from a game-theoretic point of view, and the concepts of balanced game and core are developed, and a general theorem of Scarf's is applied to prove that the market in question has a nonempty core, that is, at least one outcome that no subset of traders can improve upon.
1.4K
Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems
TL;DR: Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems as mentioned in this paper were used to solve the problem of house allocation in a house allocation problem in the 1990s.
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