About: Security challenges is an academic journal. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): China & White paper. It has an ISSN identifier of 1833-1459. Over the lifetime, 139 publications have been published receiving 683 citations.
TL;DR: The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Australia and India, made during Kevin Rudd's visit to New Delhi in November 2009, is part of a number of security agreements being entered into across the Asia Pacific as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Australia and India, made during Kevin Rudd’s visit to New Delhi in November 2009, is part of a number of security agreements being entered into across the Asia Pacific. For Australia the Declaration is a notable step in the process of developing a closer security relationship with India. However, some grant it wider significance, seeing it as plugging a “missing link” in a web of bilateral security agreements connecting Australia, India, the United States and Japan—the four members of the so-called Quadrilateral security dialogue that was proposed and then quickly abandoned in 2007. With the AustraliaIndia Declaration all four members of the putative “Quad” now have bilateral security arrangements with each other, facilitating the further development of their relationships. Should, as some argue, the Declaration and other bilateral security arrangements be seen as heralding a coalition among AsiaPacific maritime powers implicitly aimed at containing China? This comment will argue that the Declaration is indicative of the growing strategic importance of India to Australia, a relationship which is likely to develop over time. However, there are some important differences the security perspectives of New Delhi and Canberra, and the relationship is unlikely to be substantially defined by any perceived China threat. This comment will first provide an overview of recent developments in the security relationships among Australia, the United States, Japan and India which have led some to see the development of an informal security coalition between them. It will then examine the content of the Declaration and consider how it compares to the Japan-India Security Declaration. Finally, it will consider the long-term significance of the Declaration and the likely shape of the security relationship between Australia and India in future years.
TL;DR: In this paper, the Kokoda Foundation presented an overview of the Kokodas' history and mission, including the foundation's history and its current state.Copyright Information: Email permission 07/04/2015 from Chief Operating Officer, Kokoda foundation
Abstract: Copyright Information: Email permission 07/04/2015 from Chief Operating Officer, Kokoda Foundation
TL;DR: In late 2014, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo unveiled his "global maritime axis" concept, designed to reinvigorate the country's identity as a maritime nation, better defend its seas and boost the maritime sector as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In late 2014, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo unveiled his ‘global maritime axis’ concept, designed to reinvigorate the country’s identity as a maritime nation, better defend its seas and boost the maritime sector. His ambitious plan, also known as the ‘Jokowi doctrine’, is to transform Southeast Asia’s largest state located at the nexus of the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a global hub. The extent to which Jokowi can realise his ambitions, given their centrality to his policies, will be an important factor for Indonesia’s identity, economy and defence. The article explores the key components of the ‘global maritime axis’ concept and discusses the challenges facing each component. It highlights the challenges in infrastructure and logistics, naval and coast guard defence, illegal fishing and regional relations, in the context of the Jokowi doctrine. The final section of the article analyses the potential opportunities for AustraliaIndonesia relations and the impact the maritime vision has for Australia.
TL;DR: The authors argued that ambivalence about the need for a pre-ballot peacekeeping force prevented the Government lobbying as hard as we could have for one to be deployed, which may have contributed materially to the tragedy in September.
Abstract: In 1999, as Deputy Secretary for Strategy in the Australian Department of Defence, I had some involvement in strategic decisions about East Timor which led to the deployment of INTERFET. This essay, based more on recollection than scholarship, offers reflections on some of those decisions. It considers especially the questions of Australia’s overall strategic aims in 1999, and how well they were fulfilled, and Australia’s attitude towards the need for a full-scale peacekeeping force in East Timor before the ballot. On the former it concludes that, notwithstanding INTERFET’s operational success, the Australian Government completely failed to achieve the strategic objectives it had set itself at the start of 1999. On the latter it argues that ambivalence about the need for a pre-ballot peacekeeping force prevented the Government lobbying as hard as we could have for one to be deployed, which may have contributed materially to the tragedy in September.
TL;DR: This article showed that the Bougainville conflict origins involved far more complexity than natural resource revenue distribution grievances, and that the conflict itself then generated new sources of division and conflict, the same being true of both the peace process and the process to implement the BPA.
Abstract: Research on conflict resolution suggests that the significant risk of conflict recurrence in intrastate conflicts is much reduced by political settlements that ‘resolve the issues at stake’ between parties to the conflict, and that in conflicts involving grievances about distribution of natural resource revenues, such settlements should include natural resource wealth-sharing arrangements. This article shows that the Bougainville conflict origins involved far more complexity than natural resource revenue distribution grievances, and that the conflict itself then generated new sources of division and conflict, the same being true of both the peace process and the process to implement the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA). As a result, the BPA addresses many more issues than natural resource-related grievances. Such considerations make it difficult to attribute lack of conflict recurrence to particular factors in the BPA. While the BPA provisions on wealth-sharing address relations between the Papua New Guinea National Government and Bougainville, moves by the Autonomous Bougainville Government to explore possible resumption of large-scale mining has generated a new political economy in Bougainville, contributing to new tensions amongst Bougainvilleans.