Abstract: A theory of self-percepti on is proposed to provide an alternative interpretation for several of the major phenomena embraced by Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance and to explicate some of the secondary patterns of data that have appeared in dissonance experiments. It is suggested that the attitude statements which comprise the major dependent variables in dissonance experiments may be regarded as interpersonal judgments in which the observer and the observed happen to be the same individual and that it is unnecessary to postulate an aversive motivational drive toward consistency to account for the attitude change phenomena observed. Supporting experiments are presented, and metatheoretical contrasts between the "radical" behavioral approach utilized and the phenomenological approach typified by dissonance theory are discussed.

Abstract: The history of 2-process learning theory is described, and the logical and empirical validity of its major postulates is examined. The assumption of 2 acquisition processes requires the demonstration of an empirical interaction between 2 types of reinforcement contingencies and (a) response classes, (b) reinforcing stimulus classes, or (c) characteristics of the learned behavior itself. The mediation postulates of 2-process theory which argue that CRs are intimately involved in the control of instrumental responding are emphasized, and 2 major lines of evidence that stem uniquely from these postulates are examined : (a) the concurrent development and maintenance of instrumental responses and conditioned reflexes, and (b) the interaction between separately conducted Pavlovian conditioning contingencies and instrumental training contingencies in the control of instrumental behavior. The evidence from concurrent measurement studies provides, at the very best, only weak support for the mediational hypotheses of 2-process theory. In contrast, the evidence from interaction studies shows the strong mediating control of instrumental responses by Pavlovian conditioning procedures, and demonstrates the surprising power of Pavlovian concepts in predicting the outcomes of many kinds of interaction experiments.

Abstract: The central nervous System is a serial information processor that must serve an organism endowed with multiple needs, and living in an environment that presents unpredictable threats and opportunities. These requirements aie met by 2 mechanisms: (a) goal-terminating mechanisms, permitting goals to be processed serially without any 1 monopolizing the processor, (b) interruption mechanism, having the properties usually ascribed to emotion, allowing the processor to respond to urgent needs in real time. Mechanisms of these kinds, to control the direction of attention and activity, have been incorporated in some information-processing theories of human cognition, and their further elaboration will permit these theories to explain wider ranges of behavior.

Abstract: An optimal model for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is suggested. The model is normative in the sense that given few assumptions about the way the game is perceived by the players, an optimal policy is prescribed to each player maximizing his long-run expected gain. The dilemma is “resolved” by restructuring the game as a supergame composed of several component games such that transitions among them are possible. Dynamic programming is used to derive the optimal policy.

Abstract: Since Ss in Bern's (1967) "interpersonal replication of the Festinger-Carlsmith Experiment" were not informed that the amount the person they observed was paid was independent of his initial attitude, Bern's results are open to the alternative interpretation that Ss assumed the person's attitude determined the amount he was paid. Bern (1967) indicates that his "Interpersonal Replication of the FestingerCarlsmith Experiment" replicates the study by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) "with the single exception that the observer and the observed are no longer the same individual." However, there is a second, crucial difference between the two studies. In the Festinger and Carlsmith experiment, the amount of money which the subject (S) was paid to say the boring tasks were fun was independent of his initial liking for the tasks. Thus, the differences in liking for the tasks at the end of the experiment can be considered evidence that the amount S1 was paid to say they were fun determined how much he liked the tasks. In Bern's study, Ss were not informed that the amount of money which the person in the recording was paid to say the boring tasks were fun was independent of his initial liking for the tasks. For this reason, the differences in the estimates of the person's liking for the tasks can not be taken as evidence that Ss assumed that the amount the person was paid determined how much he liked the tasks. The differences could just as well have occurred because Ss assumed that the person's liking for the tasks determined the amount he was paid. Bern has not shown that naive observers can accurately predict the changes in liking for the tasks found by Festinger and Carlsmith. Bern's "interpersonal replication of the toy study" suffers from the same flaw. It does not demonstrate that nai've observers can accurately predict the changes in liking for the toys found by Brehm and Cohen (1959).