Showing papers in "Peace and Conflict Studies in 2011"
TL;DR: Ackerman and Krueger as discussed by the authors outline and apply principles of behavioral systems science, an emerging data-based approach to understand the dynamics of complex cultural systems, to the practice of constructive noncooperation (Gandhi's "constructive programme").
Abstract: Mohandas Gandhi often indicated that nonviolence was “a science,” and he appears to have meant this literally. Consistent with this vision, in this paper, we outline and apply principles of behavioral systems science, an emerging data-based approach to understanding the dynamics of complex cultural systems, to the practice of constructive noncooperation (Gandhi’s “constructive programme”). Although Gandhi emphasized that constructive action was the most important and potent of nonviolent strategic options, constructive alternatives have been the least developed in the literature of nonviolent struggle. The reconceptualization of constructive noncooperation in behavioral systems terms offered here suggests that rigorous analysis of Havel’s “living in truth” and Gandhi’s “truth force” may be both possible and practically useful in challenging oppression and supporting human rights. “I am but a humble explorer of the science of nonviolence” M. K. Gandhi (Young India, November 20, 1924) Vast resources have been dedicated to refining the science and practice of coercion, domination, killing, and war. Revolutionary movements and violent insurgencies, arguably natural responses to societal repression, have often drawn on the resulting knowledge and weaponry. There are, however, strong arguments for seeking Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 4 other strategic options for challenging oppression (Ackerman and Krueger 1994; Cortright 2006). Challenging an enemy with weapons in which he has an enormous advantage is usually self-defeating; even when such challenge appears successful, violent resistance commonly engenders a replacement system that is itself rooted in and sustained by threat of force (Deming 1971; Michnik 1985; Sharp 2005). Václav Havel (playwright, dissident, and ultimately the last president of Czechoslovakia and the first president of the new Czech Republic), suggested that should a liberation movement rely on violent resistance, “the future would be fatally stigmatized by the very means used to secure it” (1978, 93). Intriguingly, there are strong scientific arguments that support these observations. Threat, violence, and other forms of coercion are deeply braided into contemporary societies. Sidman (2001) integrated decades of research on individual and cultural behavior to explain why coercive approaches can be so pervasive, so seductive—and so damaging. Established science demonstrates that extreme coercion, even when it produces immediate results, predictably and consistently produces grave side effects, germinating the seeds of its own ultimate failure (Sidman). Systemic and structural violations of basic human rights cannot usually be resolved through negotiation processes (Sharp 2002). Fundamental rights ought not be negotiated away, and appeals to common humanity under such circumstances have seldom if ever resulted in the ceding of power. There is however one strategic option with a demonstrated history of adequate power: active nonviolent struggle (Sharp 2005). Hundreds of examples of nonviolent resistance to serious repression, with varying degrees of success, have been documented and are available for analysis (see Ackerman Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 5 and Duvall 2000; McCarthy and Sharp 1997; and Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999, for examples). Gandhi asserted that “we need experts to develop [nonviolence] into a science” (2002, 117), but only quite modest resources have been dedicated to such work (cf. Bond 1988). Dedicating only a small percentage of the resources devoted to weapons, war, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and other forms of violence to scientifically designed observational, analytic, and experimental research related to nonviolent struggle might yield enormous benefits (Martin 1997, 2005). Some valuable efforts have been made, particularly drawing on social science theory and methods. For example, Downton and Wehr (1998), drawing on and contributing to collective action theory, have examined factors predicting persistent peace activism. Jasper (1998) presented a detailed analysis of the important but neglected place of emotion in protest movements. Klitgaard (1971) brought the power of game theory to analysis of Gandhi’s tactics, a valuable approach that has some commonalities with the approach taken here. Klitgaard fails, however, to make sense of demonstrably effective methods of nonviolent struggle against “tyrants;” Sharp (2010) has clarified strategic options for such cases. Nakre (1976) studied individual satyagrahi’s cognitive understandings of, and commitment to nonviolent norms using survey methods. Wiltfang and McAdam (1991), again using survey methods and multivariate analysis, studied predictors of willingness to engage in high-risk and high-cost activities among activists. Such social science investigations clearly have made valuable contributions. At the same time, the resources committed to such work are dwarfed by those dedicated to violent alternatives. In this paper we draw primarily on a different body of scientific work, behavior Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 6 analysis and behavioral systems analysis (BSA; an approach for studying the dynamics of complex behavioral and cultural systems). Behavior analysis and BSA draw primarily on natural science rather than social science methods, and have more in common with biology, ecology, and astronomy than with the social sciences (Johnston and Pennypacker 1993). The social sciences generally bring statistical approaches to the study of an array of hypothetical cognitive and emotional constructs and conditions grounded in an array of midlevel theories (see, for example, Polletta and Jasper 2001). By contrast, the principles and theory undergirding a natural science approach to behavior have emerged from successive observations of individual organisms and cultural groups over time, typically using experimental methods. Although their origins and usual methods are quite distinct, the two strategic approaches also often draw from each other. Behavior analysis and BSA and the theory emerging from them offer methods for tracing the interlocking processes by which cultural practices and collective actions among individuals and groups function to support oppression or justice (Behavior and Social Issues 2004, 2006; Biglan 1995; Mattaini forthcoming; Mattaini and Strickland 2006), and may suggest accessible points for nonviolent intervention. Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression Nonviolent struggle is neither passive nor primarily symbolic. Effective nonviolent resistance rather involves “confront[ing] and undermin[ing] oppressive power with forceful action” (Cortright 2006, 121). Understanding this, Barbara Deming, a pivotal figure in the development of nonviolent struggle, called on oppressed groups and their supporters to “pass from protest to resistance, from merely ‘symbolic’ actions to Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 7 ‘practical ones’” that disrupt an existing repressive equilibrium (1971, 216). Gandhi himself had no patience with mere symbol, championing nonviolent but forceful action (thus his emphasis on Satyagraha—commonly translated as “truth force”). Effective nonviolent struggle involves threat or practice of active disruption of the increasingly complex interdependencies of contemporary societies (Piven 2006; Sharp 2010). Nonviolent struggle is not designed to be safe; resistance to serious oppression is always dangerous. It is, however, designed to be powerful. Gene Sharp, the doyen of nonviolence theory, offers a partial list of 198 methods of nonviolent action, divided into three major classes: (1) nonviolent protest and persuasion, (2) noncooperation; and (3) nonviolent intervention (1959, 1973, 2005). With such extensive possibilities, the choice of strategic and tactical options under varying contextual conditions is challenging (Aspey and Eppler 2001). While some (including Gandhi) have confidently asserted that nonviolent action is potentially a “full substitute” [for armed revolt] (Gandhi 1945, 3), others have strongly disagreed (Rigby 1995). Rigby concludes that nonviolence is not a functional alternative to violence; that certain ends can only be achieved through violence. This argument is based on the author’s notion that certain military interventions—such as pacifying a group of people by bombing them—hold no nonviolent alternative. Whether “pacifying” an oppressed people, by bombing or otherwise, is a worthy end is of course a separate question. A scientific perspective requires maintaining an open mind about the issue of substitutability. The extent to which nonviolence can substitute for force, whether in resistance, insurgent, military, or even policing situations, can only be determined through the kinds of rigorous study to which behavioral systems analysis can contribute. Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 8 Constructive Noncooperation Gandhi believed that the central power of nonviolence lay in creating and constructing—rather than in obstructing. What he termed the constructive programme focused on building an autonomous healthy society that refused to rely on resources provided by the oppressor, while creating strategic improvements in practical, social, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions of daily life (Gandhi 1929, 1945; Nagler 2004). Gandhi understood the constructive program (or constructive noncooperation, Schell’s [2003] term which we adopt in this paper) to be the most important strategic option for nonviolent action (Gandhi 1945). Paradoxically, this option is the single major dimension of nonviolent struggle that has been least fully explored and developed. Gandhi’s co
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a qualitative analysis, based on observations over decades of personal experience, finds only differences of degree rather than essence between predominantly-male mixed and all-women's groups regarding the effects of asymmetry.
Abstract: Asymmetry of power is an acknowledged phenomenon in negotiation, and there are a number of devices for dealing with it. Similarly, alternative dispute resolution seeks to neutralize asymmetry of power by using an interest-based model of cross-conflict collaboration, but research has indicated that asymmetry persists nonetheless. The role of gender in negotiation has been researched, and to a far lesser degree, also with regard to alternative dispute resolution. Some of the gender in negotiation research has introduced the element of asymmetry of power as well. Prompted by the highlighting of asymmetry in Israeli-Palestinian all-women alternative dispute resolution (cross-conflict collaboration), the present article seeks to determine the role of gender, comparing asymmetry in mixed groups with all-women’s groups. A qualitative analysis, based on observations over decades of personal experience, finds only differences of degree rather than essence between predominantly-male mixed and all-women’s groups regarding the effects of asymmetry. The major exception to this lies in the centrality accorded the phenomenon by women but not by men, possibly attributable to gender differences in group relations and also the feminist character of the all-female groups.
16 citations
TL;DR: Ibaba et al. as discussed by the authors argued that the issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure of government to tackle the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict and pointed out that before the amnesty proclamation, several negotiations through committees and commissions involving stakeholders had been done.
Abstract: This paper discusses the interface between violence in the Niger Delta, global energy security and amnesty granted to armed groups by the Nigerian government. The author notes the impact of the violence on energy infrastructure and brings to the fore how the violence endangers energy security. Thus far, a major concern is that the amnesty program will fail because it was not preceded by negotiations between the government and combatants. The author questions this view and points outs that before the amnesty proclamation, several negotiations through committees and commissions involving stakeholders had been done. The paper thus argues that it cannot be entirely correct to conclude that there were no negotiations before the amnesty program was proclaimed. Further, it argues that the issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure of government to tackle the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict. The deepening of the country’s democracy to ensure that votes count at elections is seen as the most likely option to guarantee the success of the amnesty program and secure the region and energy security. Author Bio(s) Ibaba Samuel Ibaba is affiliated with the Department of Political Science at Niger Delta University, where he lectures on Political Science and engages in research focused on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and development. He can be contacted at: eminoaibaba or at Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, P.O. BOX 1529, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol18/iss1/2 Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 44 Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Militia Violence, Amnesty and Energy Security
11 citations
TL;DR: For example, reflective writing and community analysis of nonviolent peace movements formed the core of my curriculum, as did critical analysis of the social processes of stereotyping and dehumanization as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: This article describes several of the more successful critical peace education methodologies and perspectives that I was able to bring to my classroom in a juvenile detention home. For example, reflective writing and community analysis of nonviolent peace movements formed the core of my curriculum, as did critical analysis of the social processes of stereotyping and dehumanization. As a result, numerous students grew in their ability to write, express empathy with others, identify bias and articulate critical analysis of their schools, among other political systems. This analysis will contribute to the growing body of work on the practice of critical peace education. Author Bio(s) Cheryl Duckworth is an Assistant Professor of Conflict Resolution at Nova Southeastern University. Her teaching and research focus on peace education, development and conflict and social movements. Her study of the indigenous land rights movement, Land and Dignity in Paraguay, was recently published (Continuum Press, March 2011). She blogs at http://teachforpeace.blogspot.com. Email: cheryl.duckworth@nova.edu. Cover Page Footnote/Acknowledgements I would like to dedicate this article to two of the finest peace educators I know, Ms. Kate Fitzpatrick and Ms. Patricia Ross, as well as all of my ―d-home‖ students who held their heads high anyway. This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol18/iss2/3 Peace and Conflict Studies
6 citations
TL;DR: Carty as mentioned in this paper discusses how different strands of social movement theory, including resource mobilization and the political process model, can be combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war.
Abstract: The Bush Doctrine, which was installed after the 9-11 attacks on the United States under the guise of the war on terrorism, postulated a vision of the United States as the world’s unchallenged superpower and the invasion of Iraq became one of the central fronts of this war. After failing to get approval by the United Nations for the invasion, the Bush Administration’s attempt to assemble a coalition of the willing became critical to the battle for public opinion to back the war. While the administration was able to garner some support, the coalition eventually unravelled and all troops are expected to depart by 2011 in what is perceived by many as a failure of U.S. foreign policy. This article discusses how different strands of social movement theory, including resource mobilization and the political process model, can be combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war. It contributes to the literature on social movements by assessing the ways in which structuraland micro-level mobilization efforts are often interconnected in order to explain both the how and the why of social movements, usually treated separately in much of the extant research. Author Bio(s) Victoria Carty is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Chapman University. She has written several articles on social movements in the United States, Mexico, and broader, transnational movements. In 2010, her book entitled Wired and Mobilizing: Social Movements, New Technology, and Electoral Politics was published by Routledge Press, and she is currently completing another book called Social Movements and New Technologies that will be published by Westview Press in 2012. Email: carty@chapman.edu. This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol18/iss1/3 Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 79 The Coalition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement
5 citations
TL;DR: Breen et al. as discussed by the authors argued that from the perspective of the laws governing both the use of force and the conduct of warfare, such an evolution is problematic for a number of reasons, such as the practical application of such initiatives is not easily incorporated into a body of law that was drafted primarily to deal with interstate conflict and only provides limited guidance on internal conflict such as that in Afghanistan.
Abstract: This article asserts that the link between peace and security and stabilization and development, as exemplified by the UN-mandated international presences in Afghanistan, is to be welcomed but that, from the perspective of the laws governing both the use of force and the conduct of warfare, such an evolution is problematic for a number of reasons. One, the broader functions of the military in peace support raises questions for jus ad bellum such as determining whether the basis for the peace enforcement has been achieved, as States and their armed forces engage in stabilization and state-building initiatives as a means to counter breaches of and threats to the peace. Two, the broader functions are problematic for jus in bello as the practical application of such initiatives is not easily incorporated into a body of law that was drafted primarily to deal with inter-state conflict and only provides limited guidance on internal conflict such as that in Afghanistan. Consequently, international law must evolve to clarify the rights and obligations stemming from peace support operations for both States and their military personnel. Author Bio(s) Claire Breen is an Associate Professor at Te Piringa-Faculty of Law at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. Dr Breen's interest in the legal obligations stemming from peace support missions is a reflection of her interest in the confluence between human rights law and the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law. This research has been generously supported by the New Zealand Law Foundation in the course of a project entitled "The National and International Legal Obligations and Consequences for New Zealand Arising from its Peace Support Operations". Dr. Breen would like to thank the New Zealand Law Foundation for their generous financial support in the conduct of research for this article. She has previously published extensively in the area of children's rights. Email: cbreen@waikato.ac.nz. This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol18/iss2/2 Peace and Conflict Studies
3 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Nsia-Pepra et al. examined the contribution of key structural variables, including the mission type, weapon type, rules of engagement, mission strength, and major power participation controlling for other intervening variables using negative binomial and logit regression models.
Abstract: This paper examines the conviction that robust peacekeeping—a strong and forceful peacekeeping force—works better than traditional UN peacekeeping mechanisms in reducing human rights violations, specifically, civilian killing, in areas of deployment. I seek to analyze both the operational and internal characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations in an effort to understand the hindrances to achieving the objective of protecting human rights. Specifically, the study examines the contributions of key structural variables, including the mission type, weapon type, rules of engagement, mission strength, and major power participation controlling for other intervening variables using negative binomial and logit regression models. The empirical results indicated that the core variable ―robust peacekeeping‖ has impact on civilian killings, namely that it lowers civilian killings. The key factor seems to be strength of mission size associated with lower numbers of civilian killings. Great power participation, peacekeeper diversity and affinity with the host state, along with identity conflicts and at least proto-democratic status of the host state appear to be harbingers of potentially higher deliberate civilian killing totals. The findings thus have both theoretical and policy implications in the field of peacekeeping. Author Bio(s) Kofi Nsia-Pepra is an Assistant Professor of Political Science (International Relations/Comparative Politics) at Ohio Northern University. Kofi was a former Air Force Officer of the Ghana Air Force (1990-1999). He served with the United Nations‘ Assisted Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). He also served with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as the Ghana Air Force detachment commander during the Sierra Leonean War. His research interests are conflict analysis and resolution, international security, human rights, international organizations and governance. His article, ―Official and Illicit Arms Transfer Data in Southeast Asia‖ was published in the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development in 2009. Email: k-nsia-pepra@onu.edu. This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol18/iss2/4 Peace and Conflict Studies
3 citations
TL;DR: Henderson et al. as mentioned in this paper argue that transitional justice mechanisms that have a high overlap between local culture and elements of procedural justice are perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit or indeed may be burdened by their operation.
Abstract: In any transitional justice mechanism there are tradeoffs between the search for retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished. To date, this tension has been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of justice, which the authors argue are limited in the extent to which they can explain why certain mechanisms—such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful. We argue that mechanisms that have a high overlap between local culture and elements of procedural justice are perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their operation. Author Bio(s) Landon E. Hancock is an assistant professor at Kent State University’s Center for Applied Conflict Management and Political Science Department. His focus is on the role of identity in conflict and conflict resolution. Recent publications include articles in Irish Political Studies (2011), Conflict Resolution Quarterly (2011) and Journal of Peace Education (2010). His most recent book, with Christopher Mitchell, is Zones of Peace, Kumarian Press, 2007. Email: lhancoc2@kent.edu. Tamra Pearson d’Estree is Henry R. Luce Professor of Conflict Resolution and Director, Center for Research and Practice at the Conflict Resolution Institute, University of Denver. She has written extensively on the role of social identity in conflict dynamics, judgment, decision-making, problem-solving and evaluation. Also an experienced trainer and practitioner she has conducted workshops and training sessions worldwide. Her most recent book is Braving the Currents: Evaluating conflict resolution in the river basins of the American West with Bonnie G. Colby, Kluwer, 2004. Email: Tamra.dEstree@du.edu. This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol18/iss1/4 Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 116 Culture and Procedural Justice in Transitioning Societies Landon E. Hancock and Tamra Pearson d’Estree Abstract In any transitional justice mechanism there are tradeoffs between the search for retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished. To date, this tension has been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of justice, which the authors argue are limited in the extent to which they can explain why certain mechanisms—such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful. We argue that mechanisms that have a high overlap between local culture and elements of procedural justice are perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their operation.In any transitional justice mechanism there are tradeoffs between the search for retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished. To date, this tension has been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of justice, which the authors argue are limited in the extent to which they can explain why certain mechanisms—such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful. We argue that mechanisms that have a high overlap between local culture and elements of procedural justice are perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their operation. Introduction Though justice mechanisms seek to hold wrongdoers accountable and deter future wrongdoing, societies transitioning after violent conflict may have multiple goals for their justice processes. Transitional justice refers to efforts made by states and/or the international community to address criminal acts and human rights abuses of former regimes during a transition from one regime to another (Gloppen 2005; Teitel 2000). Individual mechanisms of transitional justice differ greatly, from tribunals to truth commissions or even including indigenous forms and informal processes (Biggar 2003; Culture and Procedural Justice in Transitioning Societies Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 117 Minow 1998). The reputed success or failure of these differing mechanisms has much to do with the overall perceptions of the local populace. But what are the sources of these perceptions? In any transitional justice mechanism there are often tradeoffs between the search for retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished in the post-conflict arena (Biggar 2003; Minow 1998; Teitel 2000). To date, this tension has been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of distributive justice; such norms are limited in the extent to which they can explain why mechanisms outside formal tribunals—such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) or Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful (Sriram 2007; Uvin and Mironko 2003; Wilson 2003). In order to understand perceptions of success or failure of particular transitional justice mechanisms at the local level, this article will examine the nexus between local cultural traditions and the perception of procedural justice embodied in those particular mechanisms used. We argue that where there is a high overlap between local expressions and perceptions of procedural justice, individual mechanisms will be perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their
3 citations