Abstract: Generic drugs have been provided considerable cost-savings to consumers The Hatch-Waxman Act provides economic incentives to both generic and brand-name manufacturers, but it is a complicated piece of legislation scattered across numerous sections of the United States Code This obfuscation has led to abuse by brand name and generic drug manufacturers, resulting in anticompetitive behaviors for the consumer Despite attempts to ameliorate the problem, a review of case law makes plain that the judicial and legislative systems are currently inadequate to address this problem Litigation typically arises in the context of patented drug filings after a generic drug manufacturer files an Abbreviated New Drug Application for a generic drug modeled after the patented drug, an act of constructive patent infringement This then initiates paragraph IV patent litigation In order to avoid a finding of patent invalidity, branded and generic manufacturers have entered into collusive “reverse-payment” agreements in which the branded manufacturer agrees to pay the generic company to stay out of the market While direct cash payments seem to have been foreclosed in FTC v Actavis, subsequent iterations of reverse payments have evaded this holding, allowing reverse payments to continue to the frustration of many consumers Finally, the latest mode of manipulation does not involve monetary transfers, but rather manipulates the FDA system via product hopping, risk evaluation monitoring systems, and sham citizen petitions, to achieve anticompetitive aims This articles examines the patenting system for generic drugs, the numerous modes of reverse-payment, particularly with the difficulty of prescribing a bright-line approach to often fluid definitions of “reverse payments” This is the first article to review the array of reverse payment modes, explaining how legislative and judicial efforts to combat these practices have failed, and arguing for a systemic legislative approach to solving this problem

Abstract: Retail investors seem to be turning into minor actors on the U.S. and European corporate governance scene. Nevertheless, the issue of activating retail votes is becoming increasingly supported in the U.S., where a growing body of scholarship emphasizes the need to re-engage retail investors and explores a variety of possible means for retrieving the lost shareholders. Against this backdrop, this Article shows why supporting retail voting in the European and U.S. corporate landscape is not trivial. It then analyzes the potential constraints on retail shareholder engagement in the voting process posed by the current European regulatory framework and comparatively assesses whether, and if so how, the U.S. proposals for activating passive retail investor votes can provide a blueprint for a similar pattern in Europe. To encourage retail votes, minimizing cognitive costs of informed voting as well as psychological limitations associated with decision-making is necessary. Hence, this Article argues that helping retail shareholders overcome decision-making costs by widening the scope of the tools available in order to allow them tag along with more expert third parties—whether institutional investors, the controlling shareholders or the board of directors—to direct their voting decisions might usefully broaden the reach of the existing regulation in terms of its potential to increase shareholder participation.