Abstract: Using firm‐level panel data we investigate whether reform of the trade and industrial policy regimes in India introduced in 1991 resulted in a reduction in market power and/or an acceleration in productivity growth, consequences that have been predicted in theory. Econometric testing of the theory for every industry group at the two‐digit level in India yielded limited evidence of acceleration in productivity growth and no evidence of a reduction in market power. This is interpreted as suggesting that in the case of Indian industry trade liberalization has not exhibited the potential often attributed to it.

Abstract: Using objective institutional historical data for the case of Uruguay, we test the link between rent‐seeking behavior in democracies using time‐series and panel data approaches. We find three main results. First, democratic regimes are negatively linked with rent‐seeking actions. Second, the longer the duration of democracy, the less rent seeking in a society. Third, legislation enacted more transparently is negatively correlated with rent‐seeking behavior. Our results are robust to the use of different econometric methods and basic robustness tests and are consistent with prevailing theory.

Abstract: This paper uses the gravity model to investigate the market implications of unilateral and preferential economic reforms in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The results show that the traditional explanatory variables of the gravity model are the significant determinants of trade flows in the ECOWAS region, and that belonging to this grouping fosters trade. Hence policy advice should focus on strengthening these factors, which are likely to enhance the possibility of greater intra‐regional trade. This can contribute to drawing foreign direct investment to the region, enhancing policy credibility, and bringing greater economic and political stability.

Abstract: From 1992 to 1998, the Philippines saw a period of sweeping policy reforms when 273 economic, social and political legislations were adopted. When and why do policy reforms happen and what explains the scope, pace and sequencing of their implementation? My analytic narrative differs from the literature in its emphasis on: (1) the attributes of the players, particularly the role of leadership; (2) the attributes of the policy; and (3) the political rules of the game, including electoral cycles, tenure limits, veto rules and “turncoatism.”

Abstract: China’s economic transition has reached a stage where the past experimental approach is no longer sufficient. Future policy reforms need to be carried out in a holistic rather than a piecemeal manner. This paper analyzes the reforms of two related institutions in China: the household registration system and the rural land system. We argue that further institutional changes warrant national initiatives and coordinated reforms rather than merely drawing on local pilot experiences. A holistic policy package that can simultaneously promote the reforms of the household registration and the rural land system is proposed. We use fiscal simulations to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed holistic policy package.

Abstract: The role of economic policy in Finland's depression of the 1990s is analyzed with a simple model of an open economy, and the conditions for a successful financial reform derived: Let the system adjust after the removal of interest rate ceilings, and the domestic interest rate then be aligned with foreign rates before liberalizing international capital flows. In Finland, the financial system was liberalized simultaneously with international capital movements, with the domestic shadow interest rate initially considerably higher than the international market rates. A capital inflow the size of the monetary base followed, leading to the ‘crazy years’ of 1987–89. With a large current account deficit, the Bank of Finland tightened money sharply, causing a banking crisis practically wiping out the savings bank sector. The GDP declined by 13%. Several lesser policy measures aggravated the crisis.

Abstract: When there are two groups of officials in a public organization, we show that depending on the groups’ behavior – collusive or competitive – increasing the level of monitoring and punishment may have different impacts on corruption. If the two groups of public officials had been demonstrating collusive behavior, increased monitoring or punishment reduces both the level of corrupt activities and the corrupt officials’ bribe revenues. However, if the groups had not been colluding, increased monitoring reduces the level of corruption, but increases the corruption revenues collected. Only after reaching the optimum level of monitoring, is this result reversed.

Abstract: This paper considers implementation issues arising from potential reforms to the United States Social Security system. Many reform proposals involve individually invested accounts, but the corporate governance implications of such accounts have not been fully explored. Existing reform plans will result in a large fraction of votes being concentrated at one private fund manager. The implications for corporate governance and debt management under alternative fund management strategies are evaluated. The use of futures to construct synthetic investments could alleviate corporate governance and debt management problems.

Abstract: Argentina’s GDP increased 30% between 2002 and 2005, prompting optimistic assessments that the country had finally left behind its secular stagnation. However, this strong performance followed a sharp decline in economic activity and therefore could be the manifestation of a bounce‐back effect with no lasting impact on Argentina’s mediocre long‐term growth rates. The paper examines this conjecture with the quantitative discipline imposed by a Real Business Cycle methodology and concludes that the 2002–05 expansion was not only a rebound, but also considerably weaker than the model predicts, a finding not consistent with upbeat views about the country’s long‐term prospects.

Abstract: A rising wage‐gap, almost universally, in the last two decades has contradicted the age‐old conventional wisdom of asymmetric wage movements across nations when trade is liberalized. We offer an explanation that fits well with the emerging trade pattern between the developed and more advanced developing countries like India and Mexico. We argue that a tariff reduction in the South on imports of an intermediate good from the North may raise the wage‐gap in both the North and the South. The price of the intermediate good moving in different directions and different factor‐intensity‐ranking of this good relative to the two different final goods produced in the two countries underlie this result. Rising wage inequality may specially affect the South because educational expenses and infrastructure do not allow ready transformation of the vast masses of unskilled workers into skilled workers. Hence, the policy lesson of the paper seems to be more public effort in arranging for smoother acquisition of h...