TL;DR: These axioms provide a foundation for results in linguistics that are based on reasoning formally about properties of trees most relevant to linguistic theories, and include some observations on the expressive power of these theories relative to traditional language complexity classes.
Abstract: We provide first-order axioms for the theories of finite trees with bounded branching and finite trees with arbitrary (finite) branching. The signature is chosen to express, in a natural way, those properties of trees most relevant to linguistic theories. These axioms provide a foundation for results in linguistics that are based on reasoning formally about such properties. We include some observations on the expressive power of these theories relative to traditional language complexity classes.
TL;DR: It is shown that any principle or constraint on output trees formalizable in a certain fragment of dynamic logic over trees can be coded in this sense and this allows to reduce in a mechanical fashion most of the current theories of government and binding into GPSG-style grammars.
Abstract: We callsyntactic coding a technique which converts syntactic principles or constraints on representations into grammatical rules which can be implemented in any given rule grammar. In this paper we show that any principle or constraint on output trees formalizable in a certain fragment of dynamic logic over trees can be coded in this sense. This allows to reduce in a mechanical fashion most of the current theories of government and binding into GPSG-style grammars. This will be exemplified with Rizzi'sRelativized Minimality.
TL;DR: It is shown that whenever the theory of the game is group-knowledge among the players (i.e., it is the same at each node), a deviation from the solution gives rise to inconsistencies and therefore forces a revision of the theory at later nodes and therefore means that players have distributed knowledge of it.
Abstract: We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the game theorist's theory of the game is not and need not be axiomatized, the players' theory must be an axiomatic one, since we model players as analogous to automatic theorem provers that play the game by inferring (or computing) a sequence of moves. We provide the players with an axiomatic theory sufficient to infer a solution for the game (in our case, the backwards induction equilibrium), and prove its consistency. We then inquire what happens when the theory of the game is augmented with information that a move outside the inferred solution has occurred. We show that a theory that is sufficient for the players to infer a solution and still remains consistent in the face of deviations must be modular. By this we mean that players have distributed knowledge of it. Finally, we show that whenever the theory of the game is group-knowledge (or common knowledge) among the players (i.e., it is the same at each node), a deviation from the solution gives rise to inconsistencies and therefore forces a revision of the theory at later nodes. On the contrary, whenever a theory of the game is modular, a deviation from equilibrium play does not induce a revision of the theory.
TL;DR: An overview of decidability results for modal logics having a binary modality is given, and the demonstration of proof-techniques is put on to help in finding the borderlines between decidable and undecidable fragments of usual first-order logic.
Abstract: We give an overview of decidability results for modal logics having a binary modality. We put an emphasis on the demonstration of proof-techniques, and hope that this will also help in finding the borderlines between decidable and undecidable fragments of usual first-order logic.
TL;DR: These axioms provide a foundation for results in linguistics that are based on reasoning formally about properties of trees most relevant to linguistic theories, and include some observations on the expressive power of these theories relative to traditional language complexity classes.
TL;DR: This work adopts the perspective of plural logic and measurement theory in order to focus on the microstructure of comparative determiners; and second, to derive the properties of comparativeeterminers as these are studied in Generalized Quantifier Theory.
Abstract: This work adopts the perspective of plural logic and measurement theory in order first to focus on the microstructure of comparative determiners; and second, to derive the properties of comparative determiners as these are studied in Generalized Quantifier Theory, locus of the most sophisticated semantic analysis of natural language determiners. The work here appears to be the first to examine comparatives within plural logic, a step which appears necessary, but which also harbors specific analytical problems examined here. Since nominal comparatives involve plural and mass reference, we begin with a domain of discourse upon which a lattice structure (Link's) is imposed, and which maps (via abstract dimensions such asweight in kilograms) to concrete measures (in N,R+). The mapping must be homomorphic and Archimedean. Comparisons begin as simple predicates on dimensions or measures; from these we derive classes of predicates on the domain, i.e., generalized determiners (quantifiers), and show, e.g., how monotonicity properties follow in the derivation. This results in a proposal for a logical language which includes derived determiners, and which is an attractive target for semantics interpretation; it also turns out that some interesting comparative determiners are first order, at least when restricted to nonparametric and noncollective predications.
TL;DR: In this article, the expressive power of Peirce algebras is analyzed through their connection with first-order logic, and the fragment of firstorder logic corresponding to peirce algebra is described in terms of bisimulations.
Abstract: Peirce algebras combine sets, relations and various operations linking the two in a unifying setting. This paper offers a modal perspective on Peirce algebras. Using modal logic a characterization of the full Peirce algebras is given, as well as a finite axiomatization of their equational theory that uses so-called unorthodox derivation rules. In addition, the expressive power of Peirce algebras is analyzed through their connection with first-order logic, and the fragment of first-order logic corresponding to Peirce algebras is described in terms of bisimulations.
TL;DR: The main concern in this paper is on constraint-based formalisms, but the more basic case of context-free grammars is discussed, and the use of evolving algebras as a specification tool to obtain grammar formalisms is highlighted.
Abstract: We present a rendering of some common grammatical formalisms in terms of evolving algebras. Though our main concern in this paper is on constraint-based formalisms, we also discuss the more basic case of context-free grammars. Our aim throughout is to highlight the use of evolving algebras as a specification tool to obtain grammar formalisms.
TL;DR: This paper shows how this characterization of feature structures can be parameterized in order to yield similar characterizations of various different notions of feature structure, including acyclic structures, structures with appropriateness conditions and structures with apartness conditions (used to model path inequations).
Abstract: Feature structures are employed in various forms in many areas of linguistics. Informally, one can picture a feature structure as a sort of tree decorated with information about constraints requiring that specific subtrees be identical (isomorphic). Here I show that this informal picture of feature structures can be used to characterize exactly the class of feature structures under their usual subsumption ordering. Furthermore, once a precise definition of tree is fixed, this characterization makes use only of standard domain-theoretic notions regarding the information borne by elements in a domain, thus removing (or better, explaining) all apparentlyad hoc choices in the original definition of feature structures. In addition, I show how this characterization can be parameterized in order to yield similar characterizations of various different notions of feature structure, including acyclic structures, structures with appropriateness conditions and structures with apartness conditions (used to model path inequations). The generalizations to other notions of feature structure also emphasize that the construction given here is in fact independent of the application to feature structures.
TL;DR: This paper gives a simple, elegant statement of the condensed detachment rule that is independent of most general unifiers and proves that this is equivalent to the longer, more usual, formulation.
Abstract: This paper gives a simple, elegant statement of the condensed detachment rule that is independent of most general unifiers and proves that this is equivalent to the longer, more usual, formulation.
TL;DR: A simple type-free set theory is provided which can be used to give the various readings of collective/distributive sentences.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple type-free set theory which can be used to give the various readings of collective/distributive sentences.
TL;DR: The notion of anaxiomatic variety for a theory is introduced and it is shown how this notion can be used for the syntactic and semantic analysis of nonmonotonic inferences.
Abstract: The properties of monotonic inference systems and the properties of their theories are strongly linked. These links, however, are much weaker in nonmonotonic inference systems. In this paper we introduce the notion of anaxiomatic variety for a theory and show how this notion, instead of the notion of a theory, can be used for the syntactic and semantic analysis of nonmonotonic inferences.
TL;DR: It is argued, however, that the concept of logical consequence does not well apply to dependencies among belief sentences and that the requirement to account for logical relations among such sentences should be relaxed.
Abstract: Two arguments favoring propositionalist accounts of attitude sentences are being revisited: the Church-Langford translation argument and Thomason's argument against quotational theories of indirect discourse None of them proves to be decisive, thus leaving the option of searching for a developed quotational alternative Such an alternative is found in an interpreted logical form theory of attitude ascription The theory differentiates elegantly among different attitudes but it fails to account for logical dependencies among them It is argued, however, that the concept of logical consequence does not well apply to dependencies among belief sentences and that the requirement to account for logical relations among such sentences should be relaxed
TL;DR: It is shown that when intervals cannot contain non-collinear subintervals, most of the conditions described in the paper are satisfied.
Abstract: Most of the descriptions of interval time structures in the first order predicate calculus are based on linear time. However, in the case of intervals, abandoning the condition oflinearity (e.g.LIN in van Benthem's systems) is not sufficient. In this paper, some properties of non-linear time structures are discussed. The most important one is the characterization of location of intervals in a fork of branches. This is connected with the fact that an interval can contain non-collinear subintervals. As a result of non-linearity, some basic properties of interval structures must be formulated in a weaker form. Moreover, time must be filled by intervals to indicate that time cannot pass without events occurring in it. Finally, it is shown that when intervals cannot contain non-collinear subintervals, most of the conditions described in the paper are satisfied.
TL;DR: The logic ofQ (without ordinary quantifiers) corresponds therefore to the fragment of first-order logic which contains only specially restricted quantification and it is proved that it is decidable using the method of analytic tableaux.
Abstract: Van Lambalgen (1990) proposed a translation from a language containing a generalized quantifierQ into a first-order language enriched with a family of predicatesRi, for every arityi (or an infinitary predicateR) which takesQxg(x, y1,..., yn) to ∀x(R(x, y1,..., y1) →Φ(x,y1,...,yn)) (y1,...,yn are precisely the free variables ofQxΦ). The logic ofQ (without ordinary quantifiers) corresponds therefore to the fragment of first-order logic which contains only specially restricted quantification. We prove that it is decidable using the method of analytic tableaux. Related results were obtained by Andreka and Nemeti (1994) using the methods of algebraic logic.