Abstract: There is a stereotype of who can be intelligent and competent, who can have power. In Brazil it is rich, white men who represent the face of power. —Benedita da Silva, Afro-Brazilian Senator In examining politics, legislatures, and elected officials, scholars often make a distinction between descriptive and substantive representation. In the former, representatives share the social or demographic characteristics of the represented (Pitkin 1967, 60–91; Mansbridge 1996). In the latter, representatives pursue policies favorable to the interests of the represented (Swain 1993, 5; Lublin 1997, 12). From the perspective of these scholars, substantive representation may be achieved without descriptive representation. At the same time, these two types of representation are not mutually exclusive.

Abstract: n May 1996 Brazil's National Confederation of Industry (CNI) convened a meeting of industrialists in Brasilia for a mass show of unity and focused lobbying in favor of constitutional reform. Industrialists large and small heeded the call. Nearly three thousand of them from all over Brazil chartered planes and packed shuttles. Fortified by a morning of speeches demanding constitutional reforms, the industrialists fanned out over Brasilia in the afternoon to argue their case to members of the national congress. As if to demonstrate that it could not be intimidated, however, Congress chose that very afternoon to vote down a reform proposal backed by business. By the end of that year, it was clear that business had made little progress in pushing several amendments it supported.

Abstract: Beginning in 1989 Venezuelas democratic order was shaken by widespread unrest and citizen dissatisfaction. During these years sustained focus on decay disorder and systemic failure has dominated most scholarly work on the crisis of Venezuela. This paper takes a different perspective on this crisis showing that the countrys political crisis arises within a democratic system. Attention is combined to state structure and political parties with a close look at the actual capabilities of the diverse collection of groups lumped together under the heading of "civil society". In addition it is argued that decay and crisis and the emergence of alternatives are best understood not as the simple result of the "exhaustion of the model" underlying the system but rather as the product of democracy itself. Elements of crisis are then set against signs of rebuilding in order to assess the long-term viability of new movements and institutional reforms. Overall the nature of Venezuelas political crisis indicates that holding elections and providing for competitive politics with freedom of organization and expression will not be enough to guarantee against popular discontent.

Abstract: Focusing on Nicaragua after the 1990 Sandinista electoral defeat, this book is a comprehensive, multidisciplinary study of one of the most unusual cases of regime transition in the late 20th century. It shows the similarities and differences between Nicaragua's regime and those of other countries.

Abstract: This paper analyzes the contradictory impact of democratization on the Brazilian state. The return of democracy initially reinforced the efforts of clientelist politicians and "special interest" groups to win influence inside the state. Yet the resulting corrosion of state autonomy and capacity exacerbated Brazil's severe economic problems, which discredited established elites. In this crisis situation, democratic elections produced a renovation in political leadership and allowed determined reformers-first Fernando Collor, then Fernando Henrique Cardoso--to win office and try to rebuild the state, for instance through tax reform. Under democracy, the initial deterioration of state capacity thus triggered efforts to jump-start economic development and strengthen the state. How does a country's transition to democracy affect its state? This question is of great importance, 1 given the crucial role that the state has played in the economic, social, and political development of most countries affected by the "third wave" of democratization. Yet this topic has received insufficient scholarly attention. In fact, definitional assumptions may make this question appear as 2 a non-issue: Because the state is regarded as more permanent than a political regime, which can change with disturbing frequency, democratic transitions are often assumed to leave the state unchanged. Latin America's "politicized states" (Chalmers 1977; Power 1991), however, lack institutional stability. Given the fluidity of state structures in the region, democratization may have a profound effect upon the state: It may help institutionalize the state and turn it more autonomous from established social forces, or by contrast, it may further corrode the internal unity and undermine the strength of the state. Since the state has assumed an enormously wide range of responsibilities in Brazil, this country constitutes an especially good case for analysis. At the outset, a clarification of key concepts is in order. Following Weber (1976: 29), I define the state as the territorially based institution that "successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion for the execution of its orders". The core of the state--and the focus of the following analysis--is the complex bureaucratic apparatus dedicated to administration, coercion, and fiscal extraction. To the extent that the state "formulate[s] and pursue[s] goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society" (Skocpol 1985: 9), state autonomy prevails. State capacity, in turn, denotes the state's ability to attain these goals and implement its decisions; the more institutionalized state structures are, the more the state can sustain this ability. Finally, state strength is the combination of state autonomy and state capacity. Due to the dearth of scholarly attention, theoretical guidance on the impact of democratization on the state is scarce. The sporadic hints in the literature cluster around two divergent conjectures. Some authors expect a democratic transition to turn the state into a more autonomous and powerful Leviathan, whereas others foresee a Gulliver tied down by an ever denser web of particularistic links to narrow social groupings. Rival Conjectures The first set of arguments claims that democratization gives the state a higher level of institutionalization, making its organizational apparatus more cohesive and turning it more autonomous from powerful social classes and groups. Democracy enhances the transparency of decision-making and thus allows the public to hold the state more accountable. Intensified control by civil society induces state officials to assume a more unified posture and refrain from constant squabbling and bureaucratic infighting (Hintze 1981: 142-56). Increased accountability also eliminates the shady influences that private groupings commonly exert on the state under authoritarian rule. Since democratization opens up channels of interest representation for mass actors, who were tightly 3 controlled by the military regime, it also turns political participation more widespread and less skewed in social terms. The affirmation of political equality permits the "popular sectors" to de-monopolize privileged groups' privileged access to the state. As a result, the state acquires greater autonomy from dominant groups and classes. This reduction of outside influences makes it possible to enhance the 5 internal unity of the state. Democratization may also strengthen the state by turning politicians away from clientelism. Where electoral politics continued under authoritarian rule, as in Brazil, politicians were excluded from important policy decisions and remained confined to winning support by advancing particularistic demands for special favors to the state bureaucracy. With democratization, politicians regain the power to make central policy decisions. They may therefore come to care more about programmatic issues than about special favors. This turn away from clientelism allows state agencies to fulfill their administrative tasks without the constant interference of scores of patronage-hungry politicians. Since under authoritarian rule these politicians also sought to have their own cronies appointed to public posts in order to control the distribution of state resources, the turn away from clientelism allows the public bureaucracy to institute more merit-based recruitment and promotion systems, which improve the competence of state officials and enhance the cohesion of the state apparatus. In addition, politicians who were excluded from power under the military regime and who therefore did not use patronage may win office in the new democracy. Used to gaining support through programmatic appeals, they refrain from resorting to clientelist tactics (Shefter 1994: 27-34). Thus, the turnover stimulated by democratization further diminishes the role of patronage in politics. Finally, in federal systems, democratization increases the autonomy of local and regional governments. This allows the federal government to delegate many routine tasks--such as the administration of primary education and basic health care--and concentrate on fundamental policy decisions (Dominguez and Giraldo 1996: 27). Relieved of unimportant responsibilities, the central state can devote all its attention and resources to the crucial issues. This functional specialization further strengthens the state. In all these ways, democratization can enhance the autonomy and capacity of the state. By contrast, other authors expect democratization to corrode the state's cohesion and autonomy by allowing interest organizations and clientelist politicians to enhance their influence and capture public agencies. In this view, the extension of rights of democratic participation favors privileged social groups, who take better advantage of the new opportunities and further increase their influence in and on the state. In fact, to the extent that "popular sectors" gain influence, state cohesion diminishes even more. Instead of balancing elite influence and thus giving the state greater

Abstract: Preface Beginning of the Human Rights Era: Military Repression Human Rights Organizing Spreads: Mexico and the Theoretical Frame Human Rights after the Military: Settling Accounts and Facing Issues Contemporary Democracy and Efflorescence of Human Rights Organizing Contemporary Societies under Siege: Peru, Politics, and Public Secrets Transnational Networking for Human Rights Protection Response in the United States: Challenging Foreign Policy Bibliographical Essay Index

Abstract: And thus it was with many things that I’m not going to repeat: commerce, market-determined prices in certain sectors, for certain activities; a proliferation of self-employment.… And these are the opinions we have had about these things over the years, never imagining that we would have to learn to live with them for a period of time that is very difficult to predict, and that depends on many factors. Fidel Castro, 23 April 1997 During the approximately 30 years in which the exercise of entrepreneurship in a market-oriented setting was effectively prohibited, Cuba actually created a nation of entrepreneurs. Although the intention was to convert Cuba into a “school for socialism,” the reality is that Cuba has also been, in part, a school for market-oriented entrepreneurship. This, indeed, is one of the more surprising and significant paradoxes of the Cuban Revolution. The nature of Cuba’s planned economy itself has inadvertently promoted widespread entrepreneurial values, attitudes, behavior, and savoir-faire, as citizens of necessity have had to buy and sell, truck and barter, hustle and “network” to improvise solutions to their personal economic problems. While entrepreneurial talents have developed broadly among the population, their exercise, until 1993, was restricted to the important but low-level everyday tasks of sustenance and survival, often carried out in the shadow or underground economy or on the black market. But when the space available for entrepreneurial activity was increased with the liberalization of microenterprise beginning in September 1993, the expansion and diversification of microentrepreneurial activity was impressive.

Abstract: In his insightful book On the Law of Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan states that international law “is not higher law or better law; it is existing law. It is not a law that eschews force; such a view is alien to the very idea of law. Often as not it is the law of the victor; but it is law withal and does evolve” (Moynihan 1990, 19).

Abstract: mplementing market-oriented reforms is often a contentious affair, especially in new democracies. It can be time-consuming when the democratic process permits many opportunities to examine (and to block) controversial proposals. Conversely, when debate is limited by various means, the pursuit of reform can undermine the democratic regime. How, then, can market-oriented reforms and democracy be consolidated simultaneously? Comparing the extent of economic reform in Argentina and in Uruguay over the past ten years, it is hard to argue that Uruguay has made more visible progress. While both nations have engaged in dramatic trade liberalization, Argentina has achieved more deregulation, more privatization, and more rationalization of public administration. Uruguay, in contrast, has witnessed the reversal of government-led state reform campaigns in the legislature and in referendums. The contrast between the two countries recalls the old fable of the tortoise and the hare. Is it possible that Uruguay's failure to move quickly on state reform will improve its prospects for eventually consolidating democracy and economic reform? Or is the Argentine "reform first" strategy more useful? These questions serve as the point of departure for an investigation of the politics of economic reform and democratic consolidation in new democracies. In discussing these processes, a few definitions are in order. Marketoriented reform refers to structural adjustment policies designed to increase the role of internal and external market forces. This diverse package has been dubbed the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990). It includes fiscal discipline; shifting public spending priorities away from defense, general administration, and untargeted subsidies and toward health, education, and infrastructure; tax reform; financial market liberalization; a unified exchange rate; trade liberalization; equal treatment for foreign direct investment; privatization of state-owned enterprises; deregulation of the economy; and secure property rights for all citizens. Democracy is a political regime characterized by competitive elections, a variety of channels for citizen participation, and protection of civil and political liberties sufficient to safeguard the two other characteristics (Dahl

Abstract: The 1946 election for Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly marked the beginning of democratic electoral processes and the modern party system in that country. Although interrupted by ten years of dictatorship (1948-1958), nine national elections for president and parliament have been held since 1946.1 In conjunction with these elections, the Venezuelan party system has passed through four stages: a predominant party system (1945-1948), a limited multiparty system (1958-1973), an attenuated two-party system (1973-1993), and recently, the return to a limited multiparty system (1993-) (Sartori 1976). The objective of this essay is to determine what factors explain the evolution of the Venezuelan party system. Without neglecting the specific characteristics of each stage, the study centers on the structural attributes of the Venezuelan political system that can present a global picture of the process. The destruction of traditional political loyalties during the regime of Juan Vicente G6mez (1908-1935) left a political vacuum (Levine 1973, 19) that new political forces ultimately filled. During the period 1936-1947, the vacuum was filled by organizations led by leaders from the student movement. But in the trienio elections (1945-1948), a new system of party loyalties arose that had strong, lasting effects.2 The original framework of moder party loyalties in Venezuela was first expressed in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1946. A predominant party system appeared at this time.3 During the dictatorship (1948-1958) and the transitionary period to democracy in 1958, the 1947 framework persisted but was modified by sociodemographic changes that uprooted rural allegiances and made volatile a sizable sector of the electorate (Urbaneja 1992, 202; Baiez 1981, 208).4 After 1958, the original party landscape incorporated new political forces, giving rise to a multiparty system. During this stage, an institutional framework based on

Abstract: The issue of democratization in Central America has been problematized in a more fundamental and sophisticated way. Taking the view that the transition from authoritarianism to procedurally correct elections produces only hybrid regimes of radically incomplete democracies this paper describes and analyzes the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran political realities. It seeks to correct the ambivalent way "polarization" is invoked as a definitive characterization of and explanation for the state of Nicaraguan politics as well as calls attention to the contrast between high Nicaraguan voter turnout and low Salvadoran turnout. The sections in this paper present an analysis of the puzzle of comparative voter turnout in both countries; a discussion of the 1996 Nicaraguan election campaign with emphasis on putting left-right polarization in proper perspective; and a historical addendum on the contrasting fates of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran center-lefts during the 1980s and the relevance of the that factor to comparative voter turnout in the 1990s.

Abstract: Federalism has increasingly shaped Brazilian politics in the 1990s. Because the military regime of 1964 to 1985 heavily centralized government in Brasilia, civilian political forces since 1985, in reaction, have expanded decentralization in the name of representation and participation. Institutional reforms, free-market ("neoliberal") policies, and privatizations since 1990 have moved the country away from the legacy of statist authoritarian rule. The executive has lost power to the legislative and judicial branches, the union to states and municipalities, and the state to society, private enterprise, and market forces. The Constitution of 1988 recognized the local government units called municipios (loosely, municipalities) as component parts of the federation and shifted considerable political power and tax resources from the federal government to the states and municipalities (Selcher 1989). By the mid-1990s, however, defects and deadlocks in the functioning of the federal system, including its regional aspects, raised issues of representativeness, accountability, governance, distribution of resources, and fiscal soundness that began to stifle progress toward modernization, greater democratization, and solution of social problems. Brazil has become a federal state that is increasingly difficult to manage. A fragmentation of localized interests characterizes its political process, seriously hindering the building of broader coalitions necessary for a national perspective or sense of national interest in the political class and for a truly national politics. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze some of these problematical features, tendencies, and issues in Brazilian federalism today, and to trace the essence of the national debate on its future. Brazil is a very large and complex country that, in the 1990s, has been dealing simultaneously with several powerful centrifugal forces of change. Brusque and rapid trade liberalization, free-market reforms, economic

Abstract: environmental management in North America and the hemisphere at large. The agreement has spawned a series of new institutions that are already reshaping current practices and that have considerable promise for broadening the range of international commitments to environmental management in the Americas. The most prominent and most relevant of these is the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC).

Abstract: how to reform that same constitution have been going on just as long. The continuing efforts at constitutional reform in Brazil suggest the gravity of institutional choice in new democracies. The importance of "getting institutions right" is underscored, in political science, by the notion that institutional choices can undermine or solidify democratic rule. The time-consuming amendment efforts that President Fernando Henrique Cardoso is currently undertaking have reinforced the view among academics, policy makers, and journalists that the 1988 Constitution is a failure-a jumble of institutional contradictions that undermines governability. Critics note that the initial call for a constituent assembly was motivated by political demands that collided with the institutional imperatives of democratization (Martinez-Lara 1996: 191). The document itself is rife with contradictions, such as the following: * Statist provisions, such as guaranteed job stability in the public sector and restriction on foreign ownership in key sectors of the economy, that contradict the imperatives of economic growth and stability (see, e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit 1997). * Transfer of federal revenue to state and local governments without a transfer of administrative responsibilities, which opened the floodgates for corruption and mismanagement. * Preservation of a presidential system, which clashes with the task of governability, especially given the tendency toward party fragmentation (Lamounier 1994). These contradictions are generally seen as a direct result of empowering the National Congress, which served as the National Constituent Assembly (Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, ANC), to produce the country's magna carta, thereby allowing institutional choices to fall hostage to political intrigues. The result is a badly written, internally inconsistent, and transient constitution that, a decade after its promulgation, still generates debates about institutional design (Power 1997, Rosenn 1990). By standards of coherence and clarity, the 1988 Constitution is undeniably a supremely ugly document. Those standards, however, offer a narrow perspective for evaluation-a perspective that is reinforced by two institutionalist notions underlying much recent research about demoe 19 8 Consti ution a D cad Later: ly Compromises Reconsi ered

Abstract: The ecstatic election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990, his American-supported restoration to office in 1994, and the peaceful election in 1995 of President Rene Preval were harbingers of a radically new and promising era in Haitian political and economic life. For the first time in Haiti's 190-year old independent tradition, men of and chosen by the majority of Haiti's people had gained power, and attained their positions legally and peacefully. With a five-year presidency, Preval now has the opportunity to reconstruct and remold the Haitian state, to raise Haitian living standards, and to create a new political culture of democracy and tolerance. The future of his country, and the success of Haiti's last best chance to break its chains of poverty, desperation, and deprivation, depend on the choices that he and his colleagues make in the months ahead. The context of those choices is stark. Haiti remains the poorest and least industrialized nation in the Western Hemisphere. The Preval government thus has much to do. This book provides an agenda for Preval and his successors, one that examines both Haiti's political culture--its historical legacy and what that means for future reconstruction--and many of its most critical political, economic, and social challenges. In addition to Rotberg, the contributors include: Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee; Anthony V. Cantanese, DePauw University; Robert Fatton, Jr., University of Virginia; Clive Gray, Harvard Institute for International Development; Michel S. Laguerre, University of California, Berkeley; Mats Lundahl, Stockholm School of Economics; Robert Maguire, Inter-American Foundation, Jennifer McCoy, Georgia State University; William G. O'Neill, former Director of the Legal Department of the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti; Robert A. Pastor, Carter Center; Marc Prou, University of Massachusetts, Boston; Donald E. Schultz, U.S. Army War College; and Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Johns Hopkins University. A Brookings Institution and World Peace Foundation copublication

Abstract: The realities of the post-Cold War world have presented Latin American militaries with new truths, and these are placing the military institutions under pressure. This work examines these factors and offers possible scenarios for regional developments.

Abstract: The long-drawn-out military conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala have finally ended. Following the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance in 1990, the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrilla forces signed peace accords in 1992 (El Salvador) and 1996 (Guatemala) with their respective governments. In the wake of these agreements. Central America presents a new reality. The focus has shifted from war strategies to the consolidation of emerging democratic structures. The revolutionary Left, one of the main protagonists in the conflict that ravaged the region during the 1980s, now confronts a new challenge: it must demonstrate to its supporters and the general public that it indeed presents a viable political alternative. The guerrilla movements of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala waged their struggle under the banner of social and economic justice for the people. Their fight was joined by many women who sought to participate in the construction of a new society. Now it is important to establish whether the strong participation of women during the war is being translated into effective representation in the new political structures that have emerged or are still developing. Gender equality is a central indicator in assessing whether the revolutionary Left is fulfilling its promises toward its female constituents. Gender can be understood as a socially produced category, defined in Carver's terms as "the ways that sex and sexuality become power relations in society" (1996,120), Equality is used as a twofold concept that

Abstract: Like many other Latin American business communities, Brazilian business leaders sharply increased their political mobilization in the 1980s. They were responding to the context of economic and policymaking uncertainty that emerged in the New Republic (1985), the regime following the end of military rule. Two broad concerns lay at the heart of their mobilizing efforts. First, business leaders had come to believe that Brazil needed a new strategic program for economic development. Import substitution industrialization was widely perceived as an exhausted model. Thus, a number of business leaders believed it was necessary to begin a dialogue about the country's developmental priorities. These business leaders, moreover, hoped to reverse the tendency under the Ernesto Geisel administration (1964-85) to exclude business groups from policy making. This belief led to their second concern. A wide array of business leaders had come to see Brazil's corporatist system of interest aggregation and representation as an obstacle to collective action by business (Diniz and Boschi 1993, 7; Kingstone forthcoming a, chap. 4; Weyland 1998; Schneider 1997, 101-4). As a result, a series of revolts, innovations, and reforms occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s within the structure of business representation (Diniz and Boschi 1990, 1993; Nylen 1992b; Kingstone forthcoming b; Schneider 1997, 105-10; Weyland 1998). One particularly important organizational experiment was the Institute of Industrial Development Studies, or IEDI. The IEDI formed in 1989 explicitly as an effort to engage the state in a dialogue about how to promote the country's development. It brought together 30 of the most influential business leaders from a wide range of industrial sectors. These leaders carefully and successfully organized to avoid the mistakes of existing corporatist organizations, notably FIESP (the Federation of Industry of the State of Sao Paulo). Thus they offered to take the lead in solving the business community's collective action problems. Given their individual influence, it was no surprise that IEDI quickly became an important political actor. Yet by 1993, the organization had reached its pinnacle of influence and had already begun to decline. By 1997, IEDI no longer mattered politically at all, even to its own members. poratism, Neoliberalism, and the iled Revolt ofBig Business:

Abstract: Reform agendas are no novelty in Brazilian politics. Perhaps the first "reform agenda" was foisted on Brazil by the Marquis de Pombal during the colonial period (Maxwell 1995). In the independence period during the Second Empire (1840-89), reforms were frequent, especially after the Triple Alliance War in the 1870s and 1880s, as successive cabinets labored under strong pressures for change. With enhanced political autonomy granted to state governments by the constitution of the First Republic (1889-1930) and a concentration of national power in the hands of the mineiros and paulistas-the governors of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo-in their cafe cor leite power-sharing arrangement, reform, especially of the economic system, became synonymous with enhancing profits for those elites. In the late 1920s, when demands for political, social, and economic reforms came mostly from urban workers and an incipient middle class, punctuated by minor (1922) and major (1924) military revolts, the decadent First Republic elite was incapable of change or even of perceiving the need for same (M. C. C. Souza 1974). Modern Brazil's most thoroughgoing reforms were executed during the first presidency of Getfilio Vargas (1930-45). The national armed forces finally consolidated their power over state military organizations. Import substitution began in earnest, and the state launched a broad intervention in the nation's economy. The so-called "social question" was incorporated (coopted) into the reform agenda; modern social and labor legislation was adopted, complete with labor courts, retirement and health care systems, and workers' compensation. Vargas created the DASP, or Public Service Administration, in 1936, charging it to reform and modernize public administration, and the first comprehensive civil service laws were passed (Graham 1968). Luciano Martins (1995) believes that this important attempt at modernization was tempered by a strong culture of patrimonialism and clientelism that even the military regime of 1964-85 was unable to alter substantially. That regime resorted to parallel recruitment via the CLT (the 1943 Labor Code) and state enterprises. Until 1945, most reforms came almost totally from the initiative of the executive branch with very little input from the Congress. After the 1946 ardoso Government's Reform Agenda: ie from the National Congress,

Abstract: or thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba's close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Dominguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union's sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba's international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries. Ordinarily, such a massive shift in the international system would be expected to produce a significant change in U.S. policy, as it did in the cases of Russia, Eastern Europe, Angola, and even Vietnam. But U.S. policy toward Cuba changed hardly at all. That is an anomaly we endeavor to explain herein, using Robert D. Putnam's (1988) theory or "metaphor" of international bargaining as a two-level game. (For elaborations on Putnam's model, see Evans et al. 1993). The two-level game model also provides a coherent explanation of President Bill Clinton's handling of the 1994 Cuban refugee crisis and the 1996 shootdown of two small planes by Cuban fighters. Putnam argues that in any international bargaining situation, national leaders are actually involved in two negotiations simultaneously: the international negotiation (level 1), wherein the leader seeks to reach agreement with other international actors; and a domestic negotiation (level 2), in which the national leader must persuade his domestic constituency to accept ("ratify") the level 1 agreement. For leaders, the problem is that rational moves in the level 1 game may prove impolitic at level 2, or vice versa. The set of all possible agreements that domestic constituents will ratify is called the level 2 "win-set." To achieve a successful agreement, the leader must locate the intersection, if any, between his constituency's winset and what the other level 1 negotiators will accept (that is, the level 1 "win-set"). The negotiation is complex because each negotiator is playing a similar two-level game. Putnam's contribution lies in his emphasis on the interactive nature of the international and domestic processes.l

Abstract: Examines the 1994 presidential election as a way to comprehend the scope and pace of Mexican democratization and to derive general lessons about democratic reforms. Brief review of the reforms and accords reached in 1994 and an analysis of their impact; Difference of the 1994 presidential election from its predecessors; Implications of the 1994 presidential election on the debate over Mexican democratization.

Abstract: This study, by three economists at the Center for the Study of the Americas in Havana, has played a pivotal role in the ongoing discussion in Cuba about how to restructure the system of economic management and production while still retaining the revolution's goals of economic and social justice. This is the first English translation of this important work, published in Spanish in 1995 and revised in 1996. The study includes an analysis of the internal, as well as the external, structural constraints on the Cuban economy in the 1990s, detailed analysis of the options for monetary and fiscal reform and proposals for the development of what might be termed a mixed economy, organized according to socialist principles. There is also a chapter discussing some of the responses, both from within Cuba and from abroad, to the original publication. The introduction by Ruth Pearson discusses the significance of this book for the economic and political debates currently facing Cuba. Julio Carranza Valdez and Pedro Monreal Gonzalez are researchers at the Centro De Estudios de la Economia Internacional, Universidad de la Habana, and Luis Gutierrez Urdaneta still works at the Centro de Estudios sobre America in Havana, Cuba. Ruth Pearson is a senior lecturer in development studies at the University of East Anglia and professor of women and development at the Institute of Social Studies, the Hague.

Abstract: The emphasis of this book is on the structural aspects of the Brazilian economy, although analyses of economic performance are also covered. A central theme is that growth with social development requires structural reforms, such as the reorganisation of public finances and other matters.

Abstract: Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Figures, tables, index, 479 pages; hardcover $55, paperback $18.95. Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. Economic Reform and Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Figures, tables, index, 252 pages; hardcover $40, paperback $14.95. Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Figures, tables, index, 343 pages; paperback $14.95. Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Figures, tables, index, 332 pages; paperback $14.95.