Abstract: This paper proposes a critical analysis of that interpretation of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the two truths as summarized—by both Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield—in the formula: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”. This ‘semantic reading’ of Nāgārjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the ‘metaphysical interpretations’, would in itself be defective and improbable. Indeed, firstly, semantic interpretation presents a formal defect: it fails to clearly and explicitly express that which it contains logically; the previously mentioned formula must necessarily be completed by: “the conventional truth is that nothing is conventional truth”. Secondly, after having recognized what Siderits’ and Garfield’s analyses contain implicitly, other logical and philological defects in their position emerge: the existence of the ‘conventional’ would appear—despite the efforts of semantic interpreters to demonstrate quite the contrary—definitively inconceivable without the presupposition of something ‘real’; moreover, the number of verses in Nāgārjuna that are in opposition to the semantic interpretation (even if we grant semantic interpreters that these verses do not justify a metaphysical reconstruction of Nagarjuna’s doctrine) would seem too great and significant to be ignored.

Abstract: Bhāvanā, “bringing into being,” is one of Mīmāṃsā’s hallmark concepts. It connects text and action in a single structure of meaning. This conjunction was crucially important to Mīmāṃsā’s own interpretive enterprise, and functioned— controversially but influentially—in a broader theory of language. The goal of this paper is to outline bhāvanā’s major contours as it is developed by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and some his followers (Maṇḍanamiśra, Pārthasārathimiśra, Someśvarabhaṭṭa, Khaṇḍadeva, and Āpadeva) and to examine some of the arguments they marshaled in support of it. Bhāvanā is shown to open up, for these Mīmāṃsakas, an understanding of the “deep structure” of Vedic injunctions and the vocabulary for systematically representing it; it accounts for both what people do when they perform an action that is enjoined (ārthī bhāvanā) and what the injunction itself does when it motivates people to performance (śābdī bhāvanā). Bhāvanā has resonances with, and relevance to, contemporary discussions of the nexus of language, understanding, and action, and its value as a carefully-elaborated concept of hermeneutical significance should not be overlooked.

Abstract: This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of śūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of śūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupāśritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of śūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvāṇa, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses.

Abstract: This paper examines Swami Hariharānanda Āraṇya’s unique interpretation of smṛti as “mindfulness” (samanaskatā) in Patanjali’s Yogasūtra I20 Focusing on his extended commentary on Yogasūtra I20 in his Bengali magnum opus, the Pātanjaljogdarśan (1911), I argue that his interpretation of smṛti is quasi-Buddhistic On the one hand, Hariharānanda’s conception of smṛti as mindfulness resonates strongly with some of the views on smṛti advanced in classic Buddhist texts such as the Satipaṭṭhānasutta and Buddaghośa’s Papancasūdanī On the other hand, he also builds into his complex account of the practice of smṛti certain fundamental doctrines of Sāṃkhyayoga—such as mindfulness of the Lord (“īśvara”) and mental identification with the Puruṣa, the transcendental “Self” that is wholly independent of nature—which are incompatible with Buddhist metaphysics I will then bring Hariharānanda’s quasi-Buddhistic interpretation of smṛti of Yogasūtra I20 into dialogue with some of the interpretations of smṛti advanced by traditional commentators Whereas many traditional commentators such as Vācaspati Miśra and Vijnānabhikṣu straightforwardly identify smṛti of I20 with “dhyāna” (“concentration”)—the seventh limb of the aṣṭāṇgayoga outlined in Yogasūtra II28-III7—Hariharānanda argues that smṛti is the mental precondition for the establishment of dhyāna of the aṣṭāṇgayoga

Abstract: Dīpaṃkaraśrījnāna (982–1054 c.e.), more commonly known under his honorific title of Atiśa, is a renowned figure in Tibetan Buddhist cultural memory. He is famous for coming to Tibet and revitalizing Buddhism there during the early eleventh century. Of the many works that Atiśa composed, translated, and brought to Tibet one of the most well-known was his “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra). Recent scholarship has provided translations and Tibetan editions of this work, including Lindtner’s English translation (1981) and Ejima’s Japanese translation (1983). However, previously there was no known Indian or Tibetan commentary to this work. This article identifies for the first time a brief commentary to the Satyadvayāvatāra and discusses its content and purport in relation to early Madhyamaka philosophy in Tibet, and provides an annotated translation of the work. This early Tibetan commentary on the two realities (satyadvaya) provides important insight into how late eleventh century or early twelfth centuries Tibetan followers of Atiśa understood the tenets of Buddhist philosophy, the nature of valid cognition (tshad ma), and the importance of spiritual authority. The early Tibetan commentary to Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides direct textual evidence of the beginnings of scholasticism in Tibet and offers an early perspective on the formative developments in the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka.

Abstract: This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic.

Abstract: In his edicts, the emperor Aśoka Maurya extols brāhmaṇas, usually alongside ascetics (śramaṇas), as deserving honor and generosity, though he never alludes to their connection with ritual, the central theme of early Brahmanical literature. On the other hand, in Rock Edicts I and IX, he disparages sacrifices, and ceremonies performed by women, advocating instead the practice of ethical virtues. Close attention to the wording of Rock Edict IX shows that Aśoka and the Brahmanical Gṛhyasūtras talk about domestic rites in very similar terms, even describing them with the same adjective (uccāvaca). Both of them note the special role of women as a source of knowledge of such ceremonies, and differ only in how they evalute the value of such ceremonial: Aśoka disparages women’s rites, while some Gṛhyasūtras explicitly validate women as authorities in such matters. A comparison of these sources highlights the distinctive role of the term dhamma in Aśoka’s usage (in contrast to maṅgala (auspicious folk rites), and may provide some guidance for dating the Gṛhyasūtras. The fact that Aśoka does not explicitly connect such rites with the brāhmaṇas suggests that in his experience at least (i.e., in Magadha) Brahmins’ religious authority had nothing to do with domestic ritual. We may conclude that the Vedic canonization of Gṛhya ritual norms was not yet recognized outside of priestly circles, if it had developed yet at all.

Abstract: This article examines the structures of the epico-Purāṇic divisions of time (yugas/sandhyās/kalpas) and asks what is joined by the Purāṇic ages known as yugas or joinings. It concludes that these structures reflect a combining of three systems of number—Greek acrophonic, Babylonian sexagesimal and Hindu decimal— represented as divisions of time. Since most interpretations of these structures, particularly yugas, focus on questions of dharma and its decline over the various ages rather than on number, it asks in conclusion if there is any necessary relationship between number and dharma.

Abstract: An absence and its locus are the same ontological entity. But the cognition of the absence is different from the cognition of the locus. The cognitive difference is caused by a query followed by a cognitive process of introspection. The moment one perceptually knows y that contains only one thing, z, one is in a position to conclude that y contains the absence of any non-z. After having a query as to whether y has x one revisits one’s knowledge of y containing z and comes to know that x is absent from y. Thus the knowledge of the absence of x logically follows from the knowledge of y containing z through the mediation of a query. This analysis goes against the thesis according to which an absence is an irreducible entity that is to be known through senses, and is inspired by the Mīmāṃsā views, especially the Prābhākara views, on absence and its cognition.

Abstract: The philosophy of Gauḍapāda, although found in a small treatise, has remained obscure, as both the classical and contemporary approaches to reading this philosopher have overlooked his highly original contributions. This essay explores the scope of imagination in Gauḍapāda?s philosophy, with a focus on terms such as kalpanā and ābhāsa. This reading of Gauḍapāda?s philosophy tallies with some of the findings in contemporary consciousness studies.

Abstract: Most modern readers will not consider situations in which a potter makes a pot, or a pot comes into being, as being particularly problematic. A number of Indian thinkers, on the other hand, most of them belonging to the first half of the first millennium CE, did. The modern historian of Indian thought will wish to know why these Indian thinkers had problems with situations like these. He is less concerned with the question whether such situations are inherently problematic. He will be keen to know whether the Indian thinkers involved shared beliefs or presuppositions that made such situations special. Unfortunately the Indian thinkers do not tell us in so many words why situations like these are problematic. They do not present us with analyses that try to explain the difficulty. However, they do present us with a number of solutions to the perceived problem. If we wish to arrive at an understanding of the problem as they thought of it, we have to consider both the way they present the problem and the solutions they propose for it. This way we may hope to come to an understanding of the belief or presupposition that made these situations problematic. We will consider a number of passages that deal with situations of this kind. We will see that authors who describe the problem are puzzled by the fact that there is no pot when the potter makes it, or when the pot comes into being. And the solutions offered tend to tell us that, somehow, there is a pot when the potter makes it, or that there is something else to which the word ‘pot’ refers. This already suggests that the use of words and sentences plays a role. Let us look at some examples.

Abstract: Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita contains two sharply argumented critiques of the non-Buddhists’ self: one against Arāḍa Kālāma’s (proto-)Sāṅkhya version of the ātman in Canto 12, and one of a more general import in Canto 16. Close scrutiny of the latter?s narrative environment reveals Aśvaghoṣa’s indebtedness, in both contents and wording, to either a Mahāsāṅghika(/Lokottaravādin) or—much more plausibly—a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda account of the events that saw the Buddha preach selflessness to King Bimbasāra and his Magadhan subjects. Besides hinting at this genetic relationship, the present essay aims at exhibiting the structure and contents of Aśvaghoṣa’s arguments against the self, some of which can pride themselves of a long posterity in the controversy over the self.

Abstract: A basic teaching of classical Sāṃkhya is that repeated embodiment is the result of an individual’s ignorance of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa. The only exception to this is the ṛṣi Kapila, legendary founder of Sāṃkhya, who was born with innate knowledge of this distinction. It is this knowledge that leads to liberation from saṃsāra when it is acquired. This brings up the question, why was Kapila incarnated in the first place? If he already possessed this knowledge, what need did he have for further experience of prakṛti’s activity? The classical commentators on the Sāṃkhyakārikā give various accounts of the nature and origin of Kapila, but they do not directly address this question. However, the evidence of one commentary, the Yuktidīpikā, does provide clues to the reason behind Kapila’s incarnation. In this article, I argue that the author of the Yuktidīpikā views Kapila as a direct embodiment of prakṛti’s soteriological potential for all puruṣas.

Abstract: Sāyaṇa-Mādhava closed his exposition of the Cārvāka philosophy in his Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, Chap. 1 by quoting 11 and a half verses, the authorship of all of which was attributed to Bṛhaspati, the eponymous founder of materialism in India. One of these verses is presumably taken from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. However, it is not Bṛhaspati but some demons, deluded by a Jain and a Buddhist monk, who say this. Bṛhaspati does not appear at all in this Purāṇa. Variant versions of the same story are found in other Purāṇas but Bṛhaspti is not invariably present in all of them. The origin of the story may be traced back to the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. Although Bṛhaspati plays a leading part in that story, the background is quite different. By comparing all the versions found in the Purāṇas and the subject matter of the epigrams attributed to Bṛhaspati the paper proposes to show that the Viṣṇupurāṇa story has nothing to do with the materialists, whether the Pre-Cārvākas or the Cārvākas; the Jains and the Buddhists are the target of attack. Sāyaṇa-mādhava, by placing these satirical epigrams either in their original or in altered forms, and attributing them to Bṛhaspati, has mixed up the views of all sorts of nāstikas, particularly the Jains and the Buddhists, with the Cārvākas and thereby succeeded in deceiving several generations of readers and misleading even the best of scholars.

Abstract: This paper examines the role of a proper opponent (phyi rgol yang dag) in debate from the standpoint of the Tibetan Buddhist theory of argumentation A proper opponent is a person who is engaged in the process of truth-seeking He is not a debater who undertakes to refute the tenets of a proponent But rather, he is the model debater to whom a proponent can teach truth by using a probative argument in the most effective way A proper opponent is thus the model thinker conceived by Tibetan Buddhist scholars, especially by the dGe lugs pa exegetes, to explain the idea of “inference for others” The term phyi rgol yang dag figures in many text books of the dGe lugs pa school And the germ of the dGe lugs pa's idea of ``proper opponent'' is found in early Tibetan tshad ma literature, too The present paper shows that the dGe lugs pa scholars are largely concerned with the process by which one obtains an inferential knowledge about the unknown object, and also that they, when talking about a proper opponent, emphasize the pedagogical role of dialectic conversation rather than the competitive feature of debates

Abstract: A short piece of argumentative reasoning that was supposedly advanced by advocates of ‘non-orthodox’ materialist teachings has been preserved which will be referred to by the term sadvitīyaprayoga Remarks about this topic can be found in different articles, and in a recently published paper with the title ‘A Note on the Sadvitīyaprayoga’ (Franco 2012) E Franco has advocated an explanation of this argument and contrasted it with previous interpretations In the following paragraphs I will confine myself to briefly sketching an account exhibiting points of agreement and points of disagreement with respect to earlier analyses

Abstract: We frequently use single words or expressions to mean multiple things, depending upon context. I argue that a plausible model of this phenomenon, known as lakṣaṇā by Indian philosophers, emerges in the work of ninth-century Kashmiri Mukulabhaṭṭa. His model of lakṣaṇā is sensitive to the lexical and syntactic requirements for sentence meaning, the interpretive unity guiding a communicative act, and the nuances of creative language use found in poetry. After outlining his model of lakṣaṇā, I show how arthāpatti, or presumption, forms the basis of both semantic and pragmatic processes in this approach. I employ a model from contemporary linguist James Pustejovsky as one way of reconstructing Mukulabhaṭṭa’s analysis. Finally, I argue that presumption is responsible for the wide range of interpretations in creative uses of language, and that our interpretations are constrained, through defeasible in a way that our decodings of literal meanings typically are not.

Abstract: Tres tot dans leur histoire litteraire, les Jainas ont compose leurs propres versions de la vie de Krsna, un avatar de Vishnu selon la tradition brahmanique. Une de ces versions date du XVI e siecle et s'intitule Pāndava-Purāna. Il s'agit sans doute du texte Purāna le plus court. Il nous renseigne sur les religions indiennes medievales et les disputes sectaires qui sevissaient dans l'Inde occidentale a la fin de la periode Mughal. Il y a une rivalite evidente entre les Digambaras (Jainas) et les Saivites. L'A. propose l'edition de ce texte ainsi que sa traduction anglaise

Abstract: Indian and Chinese commentaries on the Bodhisattva-path assign to it a path of seeing analogous to that of the Śrāvaka-path. Consequently, the non- discursive insight of the bodhisattva is usually taken to be equivalent to the insight of the śrāvaka when s/he experiences the unconditioned. Yet a matter of concern for the bodhisattva in the Prajnāpāramitā literatures and many other earlier Mahāyāna texts is that s/he should not realize the unconditioned (=nirvāṇa) in the practice of the path before s/he attains Buddhahood. Because the bodhisattva has to accumulate immeasurable kalpas of merits in order to attain Buddhahood, s/he does not want to end the circle of existence by realizing the unconditioned. Ending the circle of existence would deprive her/him of the chance to attain Buddhahood. An early extant system of the Bodhisattva-path delineated in the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh), especially in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh) follows these early Mahāyāna sūtras in the treatment of the unconditioned. However, according to BoBh, the bodhisattva beginning from the first level can take rebirths at will and at the eighth level s/he enters into Suchness (tathatā) with non-discursive knowledge (nirvikalpajnāna). On the other hand, the bodhisattva has no esteem for the unconditioned and abstains from the abandonment of all defilements and the realization of nirvāṇa. By comparing the Bodhisattva-path in BoBh with the Śrāvaka-path delineated especially in the Śrāvakabhūmi (SrBh) of the same YBh system this paper tests whether the insight of the bodhisattva or the insight of Suchness is endowed with properties equivalent to the transcendental status of nirvāṇa or whether the insight of Suchness is a mundane insight, which still falls short of nirvāṇa.

Abstract: An earlier article (Apple, J Indian Philos 41(3): 263–329, 2013) identified for the first time a brief Tibetan commentary to Atiśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījnāna’s (982–1054 c.e.) well-known “Entry to the Two Realities” (Satyadvayāvatāra) and provided an annotated translation of the work. This article provides an annotated diplomatic edition of the Tibetan commentary. The manuscript of the commentary is a facsimile reprint located in the recently published “Collected Works of the Bka’-gdams-pas” (bka’ gdams gsung ’bum). The early Tibetan commentary to Atiśa’s Satyadvayāvatāra provides direct textual evidence of the beginnings of scholasticism in Tibet and offers an early perspective on the formative developments in the intellectual history of Tibetan Madhyamaka.

Abstract: Against the background of the fact that speakers not seldom intend to convey imports which deviate from the linguistically expressed meanings of linguistic items, the present article addresses some consequences of this phenomenon which appear to still be neglected in textual studies. It is suggested that understanding behaviour is in some respect a primary objective of exegesis and that due attention must be attributed to the high diversity of behaviour-related criteria by which interpretations of linguistic items are to be evaluated. Although we intimate in addition that individual (meaningful) sentences occurring either in oral conversations or in written documents generally exhibit a multiplicity of contents of diverse types and that the circumstance that sometimes only a content equalling the linguistic significance of a pertinent unit matters for purposes of interpretation is caused by a material coincidence of different varieties of content, the tenets advocated in the paper do not essentially depend on that view. On the other hand, the following assumptions are relevant in the present connection: (a) A number of deviances between imports conveyed by linguistic utterances and literal meanings of expressions occur due to maxims of linguistic behaviour that are quite independent of lexical and syntactic features of individual natural languages. (b) It is by no means an exceptional phenomenon that imports not derivable by grammatical rules of a particular language alone possess primary importance for interpretation and textual exegesis. In view of significant affinities between understanding of sentences and of texts it is argued that the consideration of diverse aspects of behaviour possesses relevance for textual exegesis at least in the following respects: (1) By delivering a heuristic device for discerning problems affecting adopted interpretations it encourages searches for alternatives. (2) It provides means for evaluating the degree of acceptability of particular textual exegeses and possibly rejecting them on a more rational basis than mere intuition. (3) It offers possibilities for critically assessing the validity of explicit arguments advanced in favour of or in opposition to some interpretation. (4) It furnishes a background for assessing certain disputes about translation. The dimension of linguistic behaviour also attains importance in connection with questions of exegesis which are not concerned with assessments of (propositional) contents intended to be communicated, such as the ascertainment of the function which some argument possesses in a context. For substantiating the thesis that omission of raising relevant questions concerning behaviour is not an isolated phenomenon two examples will be employed: (1) A discussion concerning the exegesis of a crucial passage of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, (2) a critical appraisal of a recent publication dealing with the interpretation of the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā-s.

Abstract: Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramāṇa—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsaṅgika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramāṇa (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsaṅgika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramāṇa in the Prāsaṅgika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsaṅgika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.

Abstract: Although somewhat neglected in the scholarly debate, Vṛṣabhadeva’s commentary (known as Sphuṭākṣarā or Paddhati, possibly 8th c. CE) on Vākyapadīya’s first chapter, offers a remarkable analysis of Bhartṛhari’s views on metaphysics and philosophy of language. Vākyapadīya’s first four kārikās deal with ontological issues, defining the key elements of Bhartṛhari’s non-dualistic edifice such as the properties of the unitary principle, its powers, the role of time and the ontological status of worldly objects. Vṛṣabhadeva’s interpretation of the kārikās in question is intriguing and seems to be guided by the urgency to find a solution to the riddle which every non-dualistic theory has to face: how is it possible to postulate a unitary principle of reality when reality is cognized as multiple? In accomplishing the task Vṛṣabhadeva proposes various solutions (some of them based on concepts which are hardly detectable in Vākyapadīya and appear close to the ones propounded in certain trends of Advaita Vedānta), finally suggesting an explanation which, focusing on the pragmatic aspect of language, is altogether consistent with Bhartṛhari’s theoretical picture.