Showing papers in "Journal for General Philosophy of Science in 1989"
TL;DR: On a theory of the Collapse of the Wave Function, Stapp as discussed by the authors proposed a new characteristic of a quantum system between two measurements -a "Weak Value", which is defined as the difference between two values of the same value.
Abstract: On a Theory of the Collapse of the Wave Function.- On the Measurement Problem of Quantum Mechanics.- A New Characteristic of a Quantum System Between Two Measurements - A "Weak Value".- Can the Quantum Measurement Process be put into QED?.- Chained Bell Inequalities.- From George Boole to John Bell - The Origins of Bell's Inequality.- The Logic of Quantum Nonseparability.- Bell's Theorem and Mermin's Gedanken Experiment.- Searching for Mutually Unbiased Observables.- Going Beyond Bell's Theorem.- Quantum Field Theory, Bell's Inequalities and the Problem of Hidden Variables.- What Locality Isn't: A Response to Jarrett.- Bell's Theorem: The Forgotten Loophole and How to Exploit It.- Are More Economical Escapes From Bell's Strictures Possible?.- Concerning Theories Free From Bell's Constraint.- The EPR Paradox, Actions at a Distance and the Theory of Relativity.- Conditionals, Probability and Bell's Theorem.- Relativity and Probability, Classical or Quantal.- Relativistic Probability Amplitudes and State Preparation.- Non-Linearity and Post-Bell Quantum Mechanics.- Observable Effects of the Uncertainty Relations in the Covariant Phase Space Representation of Quantum Mechanics.- Geometry of Cyclic Quantum Evolutions.- On the Computer Simulation of the EPR-Bohm Experiment.- Discrete Phase-Space Model for Quantum Mechanics.- A Possible Explanation of Quantum Mechanics Behavior by a Classical Cellular Automaton Construction.- Quantum Mechanical Information is Ubiquitous.- The Unobservability of Spinor Structure.- Teaching QM: True, Trivial, Inevitable.- Quantum Cosmology and Quantum Mechanics.- Cosmology, EPR Correlations and Separability.- Bell's Theorem: Form and Information in the Quantum Theory.- Horizons of Knowledge in Cosmology.- The Ontological Status of the Cosmological Singularity.- Quantum Cosmological Generality of Inflation in Anisotropic Spacetime.- Mass Generation in the Early Universe.- Massive Photons and Monopoles.- The Large-Scale Streaming of Galaxies.- The Numerically Simple Universe.- Size of a Least Unit.- Bell, Book and Candle: The Limning of a Mystery.- Complementarity and Space-Time Description.- Complementarity and Cosmology.- Quantum Ontologies.- Henry P. Stapp on Quantum Theory and Reality.- For Whom the Bell Tolls: A Plea for Fundamental Ontology.- The Role of Consciousness in Physical Reality.- The Significance of Human Observation in Measurement in Quantum Mechanics The Nature of the Traditional Separation Between Psychology and Physics.- The Universe in the Light of Contemporary Scientific Developments.- Name Index.
2,285 citations
TL;DR: In this article, eine Unterscheidung zwischen eine einzelne Wissenschaft (z. B. Physik, Chemie) eigentumlichen Problemen and technologischen Problems vorgeschlagen is discussed.
Abstract: Es wird eine Unterscheidung zwischen fur eine einzelne Wissenschaft (z. B. Physik, Chemie) eigentumlichen Problemen und technologischen Problemen vorgeschlagen. Dieser Unterscheidung liegt eine Auffassung zugrunde, nach welcher jede Wissenschaft einen speziellen Ausblick auf die Welt erarbeitet, einen Ausblick, der nur diejenigen Aspekte eines wirklichen Vorgangs heraussucht und sich aneignet, welche fur diese Wissenschaft eigentumlich sind. Im Gegensatz dazu erfast die Technologie Vorgange in der Gesamtheit ihrer Aspekte. Auf der Grundlage dieser Unterscheidung werden die Grundzuge des Verfahrens, welches zur Losung von technologischen Problemen fuhrt (Mittel zur Losung, Natur des Verfahrens, besondere Kennzeichen der erzielten Losungen), diskutiert.
24 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Zweifel erregt an vier philosophischen Annahmen uber Mathematik, der Mathematik is the Lehre der Klassifikation, insoweit als sie vollstandig abstrahiert von der Art der zu klassifizierenden Dinges.
Abstract: Der Beweis des Vierfarbensatzes mit Hilfe eines Computers, der so viel Zeit erforderte, das ein Mensch die Berechnungen niemals uberprufen konnte, hat Zweifel erregt an vier philosophischen Annahmen uber Mathematik. Die Mathematik ist die Lehre der Klassifikation, insoweit als sie vollstandig abstrahiert von der Art der zu klassifizierenden Dinge. Diese Auffassung wird vom Beweis des Vierfarbensatzes nicht erschuttert. Wahrscheinlich kann mathematisches Denken nicht vor sich gehen ohne sinnliche Vorstellungen, aber die Eigenschaften mathematischer Gegenstande sind unabhangig von ihrer Weise sinnlicher Vorstellung.
5 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, ausgefuhrt, das Poppers Falsifikationskriterium einen logischen Fehler enthalt is discussed.
Abstract: In diesem Beitrag wird ausgefuhrt, das Poppers Falsifikationskriterium einen logischen Fehler enthalt. Die Regeln deduktiver Ableitung sind selbst fur ihre Durchfuhrung von induktiver Ableitung (z. B. Erinnerungsvermogen) abhangig. Um das “Criterion of Falsification” fur gultig zu erklaren, beruft sich Popper auf diese Regeln deduktiver Ableitung.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a kontinuierliche Reinterpretation der Begriffe is discussed, eine zufriedenstellende Erklarung der Supraleitfahigkeit und Superfluiditat zu erreichen.
Abstract: Supraleitfahigkeit und Superfluiditat sind die einzigen bekannten makroskopischen Quantenphanomene. Ihre Untersuchung liefert interessante Hinweise, um einige der Fragen zu verstehen, die mit den Grenzen der Gultigkeit der Quantenmechanik verbunden sind. In diesem Aufsatz wollen wir den Prozes entzifferen, durch den ein beobachtetes unerwartetes Phanomen in ein physikalisches Problem ubergefuhrt wird, und wir zeigen die kontinuierliche Reinterpretation der Begriffe, um eine zufriedenstellende Erklarung der Supraleitfahigkeit und Superfluiditat zu erreichen.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss syntaktischen Auffassung der wissenschaftlichen Theorien and tritt dafur ein, das die einzig mogliche Alternative eine modelltheoretische Annaherung ist.
Abstract: Diese Abhandlung diskutiert und kritisiert einige Aspekte der syntaktischen Auffassung der wissenschaftlichen Theorien und tritt dafur ein, das die einzig mogliche Alternative eine modelltheoretische Annaherung ist.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that Kant's categorisation is a construction post factum according to his already accepted 12 categories of intellect and not supported from a modern view of logic.
Abstract: With regard to scientific theory it is important to note that Kant in contrast to many later authors, believes that philosophy is a knowledge. To prove his argument, Kant found scientific examples for philosophical theses. According to his 12 categories of intellect he attempted to prove his view by the construction of 12 logical judgements. His scheme is considerably different to the Aristotelian devision of judgements despite his own view that the logic did make no progress since Aristotle. Kants categorisation differs also from the devisions of all 18th century philosophers. It appears that his categorisation is a construction post factum according to his already accepted 12 categories of intellect. His devision is furthermore not supported from a modern view of logic. It would therefore appear that under the view of modern theory of science Kant did not give a proof for his scheme of categories.
2 citations
TL;DR: The distinction between sociology of science on the one hand and methodology and systematics on the other, is an established historical fact as mentioned in this paper, and even in modern methodologically orientated philosophy, epistemological analyses still tend to disregard the pragmatic contexts within which scientific knowledge is produced, processed and applied.
Abstract: The distinction between sociology of science on the one hand and methodology and systematics on the other, is an established historical fact. Thus, even in modern methodologically orientated philosophy, epistemological analyses still tend to disregard the pragmatic contexts within which scientific knowledge is produced, processed and applied. This situation also reflects the well-known fact that philosophy of science has largely ignored the conceptual and methodological foundations of technology, that is, those disciplines directly and explicitly linked to the practical implications and intended applications of scientific research. The following considerations suggest that the methodology of technology provides useful and generally applicable criteria of the evaluation and acceptance of the hypotheses and theories of empirical science.
1 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Agassi hat in dieser Zeitschrift meine Analyse von Quines Stellung in der analytischen Tradition kritisiert und dabei insbesondere die Irrelevanz von Neurath betont und Quines Nahe zu Popper herausgestellt.
Abstract: Professor Joseph Agassi hat in dieser Zeitschrift meine Analyse von Quines Stellung in der analytischen Tradition kritisiert und dabei insbesondere die Irrelevanz von Neurath betont und Quines Nahe zu Popper herausgestellt. In meiner Antwort geht es mir sowohl um eine Rehabilitation Neuraths als auch um die Unterschiede von Quines Philosophie zu Popper und Wittgenstein.
1 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation and instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation.
Abstract: The new so-called pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation. Causal explanations are excluded from the debate. Instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation. The paper criticizes this restrictive approach for methodological and terminological reasons without denying the importance of epistemic, pragmatic considerations. In addition, the respective traditional thesis on the logical-structural identity of prediction and explanation and the new epistemic turn with respect to this thesis are criticized. The latter seems to lead to confrontations between every day and scientific explanations. The epistemic liberalisation of terminology and methodology certainly admits of new forms of systematization, e.g. potential prediction, but a general theory of systematization should not be too restrictive and should at the same time retain the classical distinction between epistemic and genuine lawful explanations.
TL;DR: In this paper, the relation of thought and truth is explained by using Frege's theory of sense and reference, which is used to clarify the objective notion of judgement, and to make it possible to advance from the thought and the understanding of a sentence to the acknowledgement of its truth.
Abstract: According to Frege the notion of judgement cannot be defined, but must be explicated by referring to natural language. Frege uses a subjective and an objective notion of judgement: on the one hand a judgement is an inner mental process, on the other hand judging is explained as advancing from the thought to the truth-value. The subjective notion of judgement logically depends on the objective conception of a judgement, but nevertheless remains indispensable. To clarify the objective notion of judgement, the relation of thought and truth must be explicated by using Frege's theory of sense and reference. Only an intersubjective and action-guiding knowledge of the way in which the truth-value of a sentence is determined can make it possible to advance from the thought and the understanding of a sentence to the acknowledgement of its truth. Since by this advance a sentence receives a cognitive value, Frege's theory of sense and reference makes a contribution not only to semantics but also to epistemology.
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the theories of modern cognitive psychology of perception and recognition show, under rigorous logical analysis, the same problems which arise in the philosophical theories of knowledge of Descartes and Locke and lead to relativistic and solipsistic consequences.
Abstract: It is argued that the theories of the modern cognitive psychology of perception and recognition show, under rigorous logical analysis, the same problems which arise in the philosophical theories of knowledge of Descartes and Locke and lead to relativistic and solipsistic consequences. Through examination of the approachs of D. Sanders, E. B. Goldstein and J. Fodor it is shown that the perceptible world in these theories dissolves in internal representations so that despite its realistic starting-point modern cognitive psychology runs into epistemological idealism or solipsism.