Abstract: This article offers a general argument against the orthodox ‘object-given’/‘state-given’ theory, according to which the distinction between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason is just the distinction between ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons, on the grounds that it fails to account for ‘right’ kind reasons against intention and belief.

Abstract: This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for one action or attitude because there is reason for another. I argue that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a different way to the right kind of reasons and that this fact is best explained by the skeptical view.

Abstract: The Evolutionary Challenge for moral realism is, roughly, the challenge to explain our having many true moral beliefs, given that those beliefs are the products of evolutionary forces that would be indifferent to the moral truth. This challenge is widely thought not to apply to mathematical realism. In this article, I argue that it does. Along the way, I substantially clarify the Evolutionary Challenge, discuss its relation to more familiar epistemological challenges, and broach the problem of moral disagreement. I conclude that there may be no epistemological ground on which to be a moral antirealist and a mathematical realist.

Abstract: Punishment is notoriously difficult to justify because it involves visiting hard treatment upon those who are punished. The rights forfeiture theory of punishment contends that punishment is justified when and because the criminal has forfeited her right not to be subjected to this hard treatment. Because of a number of apparently devastating objections, this account has very few advocates. In this essay I aim to rehabilitate the rights forfeiture account by offering responses to the standard criticisms.

Abstract: We present a unified empirical and philosophical account of moral consistency reasoning, a distinctive form of moral reasoning that exposes inconsistencies among moral judgments about concrete cases. Judgments opposed in belief or in emotion and motivation are inconsistent when the cases are similar in morally relevant respects. Moral consistency reasoning, we argue, regularly shapes moral thought and feeling by coordinating two systems described in dual process models of moral cognition. Our empirical explanation of moral change fills a gap in the empirical literature, making psychologically plausible a defensible new model of justified moral change and a hybrid theory of moral judgment.

Abstract: In order to be a self-governing agent, a person must govern the process by means of which she acquires the intention to act as she does. But what does governing this process require? The standard compatibilist answers to this question all assume that autonomous actions differ from nonautonomous actions insofar as they are a more perfect expression of the agent’s agency. I challenge this conception of autonomous agents as super agents. The distinguishing feature of autonomous agents is, I argue, the nonagential role they play in the formation of their intentions. I offer an account of the relevant role.

Abstract: In this essay we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects,” that is, projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.

Abstract: Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality.

Abstract: Christopher Heath Wellman has argued that freedom of association gives legitimate states a right to close their borders to even the most needy foreigners. I believe Wellman is wrong about freedom of association and thus is wrong about immigration. I use the history of antidiscrimination law to argue that freedom of association is not a simple trump right but is part of a complex package of rights—a package whose contents are in tension and whose use requires moral judgment. This means, I argue, that a proper respect for freedom of association need not entail Wellman’s stark conclusion.

Abstract: Traditional debate on the metaphysics of gender has been a contrast of essentialist and social-constructionist positions. The standard reaction to this opposition is that neither position alone has the theoretical resources required to satisfy an equitable politics. This has caused a number of theorists to suggest ways in which gender is unified on the basis of social rather than biological characteristics but is “real” or “objective” nonetheless—a position I term ‘social objectivism’. This essay begins by making explicit the motivations for, and central assumptions of, social objectivism. I then propose that gender is better understood as a real kind with a historical essence, analogous to the biologist’s claim that species are historical entities. I argue that this proposal achieves a better solution to the problems that motivate social objectivism. Moreover, the account is consistent with a postpositivist understanding of the classificatory practices employed within the natural and social sciences.

Abstract: Political liberals ask citizens not to appeal to certain considerations, including religious and philosophical convictions, in political deliberation. We argue that political liberals must include a demanding requirement of intellectual modesty in their ideal of citizenship in order to motivate this deliberative restraint. The requirement calls on each citizen to believe that the best reasoners disagree about the considerations that she is barred from appealing to. Along the way, we clarify how requirements of intellectual modesty relate to moral reasons for deliberative restraint. And we argue against attempts to weaken our requirement of intellectual modesty by emphasizing those moral reasons.

Abstract: Gopal Sreenivasan’s “hybrid theory” states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty. An alternative “plain theory” states that the individual’s interests justify the duty itself. I argue that a strong moral status constraint explains Sreenivasan’s instrumentalization objection to a Razian plain theory but that his own model violates this constraint. I suggest how both approaches can be reformulated to satisfy the constraint, and I argue that a reformulated plain theory can also avoid an insufficiency objection. The hybrid approach consequently has no clear advantage over the plain approach.

Abstract: A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible views about rationality—wherein someone cannot have stronger reason to do A than B, B than C, and C than A—and commonsense morality.

Abstract: In “Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints,” Mark LeBar claims to have discovered a two-level eudaimonist position that coheres with the claim that moral obligations are “real” and have “nonderivative normative authority.” In this article, I raise worries about how “real” second-personal reasons are on LeBar’s account, and then argue that second-personal reasons ramify up from the first to the second level in a way that LeBar denies. My argument is meant to encourage philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition to question the existence of second-personal reasons of the sort Darwall elucidates.

Abstract: This article begins the task of assessing polygamy as a moral ideal. The structure of traditional polygamy, in which only one central spouse may marry multiple partners, necessarily yields two inequalities. The central spouse has greater rights and expectations within each marriage and greater control over the wider family. However, two alternative structures for polygamy can remove these inequalities. In polyfidelity, each spouse marries every other spouse in the family. In “molecular” polygamy, any spouses may marry a new spouse outside the family. These new models of polygamy face additional difficulties, but they can be egalitarian in principle.

Abstract: I respond here to an argument in David Shoemaker’s recent essay, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Shoemaker finds that “Scanlonian” approaches to moral blame err insofar as they do not include a capacity to respond to moral considerations among the conditions on blameworthiness. Shoemaker argues that wrongdoers must be able to respond to moral reasons for their behavior to express the disrespect to which blaming attitudes like resentment respond. I offer reasons for rejecting this argument.

Abstract: Tim Willenken argues that ‘commonsense morality’ is committed to intransitive deontic cycles; that consequentialism cannot countenance such cycles; and that, therefore, the project of compatibilism—making consequentialism and commonsense morality deliver the same moral verdicts, by way of an axiology—cannot succeed. I argue that the appearance of intransitive cycles is made possible only by an idiosyncratic method of action-individuation; when traditional methods are used, the appearance of intransitivity goes away. These results may reopen the door for the compatibilist project.

Abstract: work. An exactly analogous set of problems besets the idea that epistemic reasons should really be thought of as a special case of reasons to do something— where what you do is to have a certain belief. On this view, each epistemic default A → B should really reduce to the “practical” default, A → bfðBÞ, where bfðBÞ is interpreted as meaning that the agent in question believes that B. But now it should be easy to see that wewill get exactly the same kind of problems for this proposal as for the reverse view. Because bfðCÞ and bfð∼CÞ are not inconsistent, translating conflicting epistemic defaults into practical defaults whose conclusions are about beliefs will not preserve competition between defaults. And because bfðCÞ doesn’t entail C, the translation also upsets the chaining of defaults. Again, I think there are possible fixes that are at least worth exploring, but again I think the problem strongly suggests that this view does not fit very well with what Horty says about both epistemic and practical reasons. Considerations like these thereforemakeme suspect that on the right way of thinking about the picture behind Horty’s interpretation of default logic as telling us the logic of how reasons come together to support conclusions, neither reasons to do things nor reasons to believe things are a special case of one another. And if neither is a special case of one another, then the only thing that both reasons for action and reasons for belief have in commonmust be the logic by which they determine conclusions—Horty’s prioritized default logic. But if that is right, then the subject of Horty’s book is not just one among other interesting topics about reasons, nor even an important though underexplored one. It is the central question about the nature of reasons themselves.

Abstract: and that this same view of people is fundamental to the idea of human rights ð261Þ is extremely weak and subject to objections at each point. The typical move in this section of the book is to take a strong and specific view, show that it implies a weaker, more general one, and then take that to show that the strong and specific one is implied by the weaker and more general. This clearly will not work, and I do not think that Fox-Decent is at all successful in this section of the book. Despite my misgivings, especially about the last section of the book, there is much of value here. In particular, it is useful to see in some detail how the idea of taking the state to be a fiduciary for its people may be worked out in many different circumstances, and it is also satisfying to see a legal and political philosopher spending time on the problems that arise from the administrative state. The book deserves study from those interested in the question of sovereignty and the legitimacy of government and students of the administrative state.

Abstract: What would the ideal philosophical book on global justice look like? First and most important, it would develop an original and rigorous argument for significant conclusions concerning the content and foundations of our cross-border obligations. Second, it would skillfully combine the moral principles that it defended with robust, up-to-date empirical research on global politics and economics, thereby generating a compelling set of policy recommendations. Third, arguably, it would be accessible and interesting to nonphilosophers: scholars in the other humanities and social sciences, policy makers, and perhaps even members of that holy grail of academic book publishing, the general public. Nicole Hassoun’s Globalization and Global Justice, to its author’s credit, adopts all of these aims. However, the book largely fails to deliver on them. Globalization and Global Justice is divided into two parts, each containing three chapters. The first part, the philosophical core of the book, develops Hassoun’s “Autonomy Argument,” which she summarizes as follows:

Abstract: is the overcoming of attention on the self. On this picture of agency, inner deliberation is an ongoing struggle forming an essential continuum with choice and action. In articulating this view, Bagnoli departs from the received view of Murdoch as a Platonic realist, seeming to suggest at times that Murdoch is better understood as a constructivist. In this she appears to agree with Antonaccio’s notion of Murdoch as a “reflexive realist.” Many other essays are creative and insightful. For example, Crisp investigates the idea of the noble through an analysis of the heroic self-sacrifice of Magda Trocmé during World War II. He argues that none of the three major ethical theories, utilitarianism, Kantianism, andAristotelian virtue ethics, can adequately account for this nobility, though each should be able to. Murdoch, by contrast, can not only acknowledge it, but offers a sketch of the nature of its moral value. Clarke considers the “uncritical conservatism” objection against virtue ethics: the charge that the virtuous agent lacks the resources to be independently critical of social norms. She highlights socially sensitive patterns of perception that she finds tacitly at work in Murdoch, yet acknowledges that this is unlikely to satisfy those, such as Kantians, who insist that independent moral principles are needed to correct socially influenced moral perception. This is because Murdoch would reject the idea that goodness depends on such principles. Aside from qualms about the organization of the contributions, I have two criticisms of this otherwise splendid volume. The first is that the essays suffer from redundancy. They reiterate Murdochian themes, especially the famous example of ‘M’ and ‘D’ that recounts the change in moral vision of the mother-in-law vis-àvis her daughter-in-law. Since the example is central, the frequency of its appearances is unsurprising. Moreover, Murdoch’s themes are interlocking, so the treatment of one often requires more than cursory mention of others. Yet, by the end of the volume, the reader feels some themes have received too much attention and others, such as Murdoch’s attraction to mysticism and the work of Simone Weil, have been neglected. Finally, some authors are far more conversant with Murdoch’s work than others. This results in unevenness among the contributions. Yet these concerns should not dissuade readers from profiting from the many insights this volume offers.

Abstract: ð78–87Þ, an issue that she ultimately says does not need to be settled in order for her conclusion to go through ð87Þ. At other points, where further elaboration would in fact be helpful for a broader audience—for instance, in the critique of the comparative advantage argument for free trade—Hassoun’s discussion is overly dense and dry for novices. All of this suggests thatGlobalization and Global Justice is poised unhappily between two genres: the popular book ða genre it fails to fit, being insufficiently accessible and engagingÞ and the philosophical treatise. It falls short of the best examples of the latter because—no doubt out of a desire to be accessible and ecumenical—it ends up steering clear of the interesting detail and more controversial debates in the field. If this book is likely to disappoint, that is in part because of thedifficulty of the task that its author sets herself. Those of us still hoping for that ideal book on global justice will have to wait a little longer to get it.

Abstract: In general, we think that when it comes to the good of another, we respect that person’s will by acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. I argue that this is not necessarily true. When it comes to the good of another person, it is possible to disrespect that person’s will while acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. Seeing how this is so, I argue, enables us to clarify the distinct roles that the wills of competent and incompetent people should play in third-party deliberations about their welfare.

Abstract: Libertarian self-ownership views have traditionally maintained that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against any infringement upon our property. This stringency yields very counterintuitive results when we consider trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such as having planes fly overhead. Maintaining that other people’s rights against all infringements are very powerful threatens to undermine our liberty, as Nozick saw. In this essay I consider the most sophisticated attempts to rectify this problem within a libertarian self-ownership framework. I argue that all of these responses are significantly flawed.