Abstract: Quietism brought the individual to a state of "holy indifference" where nothing mattered; particularities of Christian belief and practice, pleasures of the senses, personal desires, all vanished in the utter self-abandonment of the soul in the presence of God. The "resigned" soul simply left everything to God. This was a mode of spirituality but also a challenge to the Church and the need for its sacraments. Ecclesiastical authorities of various colors, both protestant and Roman Catholic, found this unacceptable in its earlier manifestations in the later Middle Ages and again in its heydey in the late seventeenth century. Meanwhile in the sixteenth century, adiaphora had become controversial. These were matters of Christian belief and practice about which Christian opinion could legitimately vary and which were therefore "indifferent." This paper explores the ways in which both these controversies rose from the same underground stream of medieval dissidence, discussing the contributions of the leading characters in the story and seeking to describe the common ground of idea and ideology which unites the history and which suggests that Quietism represents an archetype among the great "positions" of Christendom.

Abstract: An examination of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French history indicates that the relationship between the Jesuits and Quietism was shaped by politics as well as by concerns of theological orthodoxy. During the late 1690s, the Jesuits championed Francois Fenelon accused of Quietism at the same time as they spearheaded an attack against Quietism in Burgundy, emphasizing crimes of spiritual incest or the abuse of clerical authority. Such ambiguity indicates that the Jesuits were motivated by a desire to consolidate political power in Louis XIV . . . trades court. However, the fusion of Quietist heresy, charges of spiritual incest, and political gamesmanship would ultimately make the Jesuits themselves vulnerable to claims of heresy and abuse when the Girard/Cadiere affair became a national scandal in 1731. This essay argues that this disquiet over clerical behavior and power was articulated in a changing political culture between the late seventeenth century and the 1730s. Growing dissatisfaction against the crown established a new political consciousness, one that regarded the politics of secrecy as problematic if not outright illegitimate. The secrecy of the confession, the emphasis on interiority seemingly at the expense of morality, and the enigmatic language of mysticism, all associated with Quietism played into fears of clerical (or “Jesuit”) cabal and conspiracy. When Jesuit opponents linked the order to Quietism, they presented the Jesuits as threats to an emerging set of political values in which legitimate authority was transparent and open while illegitimate power operated in the shadows.

Abstract: Taking as its point of departure a systematic presentation of the various types of misunderstandings, ranging from the most banal and benign to the most perverse and pernicious, this text principally examines the ways in which they can pave the way for disagreement. While it is possible that a rational examination of motives and sources pertaining to a misunderstanding may help to minimize its undesirable effects upon communication, a misunderstanding may also signal the incontrovertible and irresolvable nature of a disagreement. This paper, therefore—while basically Habermasian in its orientation—also questions the validity of Jurgen Habermas’s premises regarding the ethics of communication: the scope given to speculative reason and the effectiveness of an explicative metadiscourse for clarifying misunderstanding or resolving conflicts; the possibility of authentic discourse in certain conflict situations; consensus as the ultimate goal of dialogue. Although Habermas stipulates that the expectation of validity is incumbent upon any authentic exchange, this paper underscores instead the expectation of satisfaction, which compels all individuals seeking to communicate. Through this comparison, the paper attempts to show that even the most tenacious disagreement originates in this affective nexus, and to show as well how we may construct ethical practices that are contingent upon disagreement.

Abstract: In his meditation on Emerson's self-reliance, George Kateb argues that Emerson's entrance into antislavery politics, particularly his calls for collective mobilization, constitutes a "deviation from his theory of self-reliance, not its transformation." Though Emerson often imagines a self-reliance that can lead to action, his descriptions of the fundamental attitude of the self towards the world suggest passivity, attention, and waiting. Because he rules out logical or teleological sources for inspiration, his conception of self-reliance is fundamentally at odds with progressivist narratives of history. His sense of "entranced waiting" flirts with an anarchic potentiality that he must reject in order to call for social solidarity and progressive action against slavery. In "Bartleby, the Scrivener," Melville takes the radical outsidedness of self-reliance to its conclusion, transforming Emersonian waiting into Bartleby's catatonic stillness. Emerson's waiting for inspiration becomes the copyist's quiet demand that his employer wait with him rather than use charitable actions to free himself from the burden Bartleby imposes. Bartleby obstructs the lawyer's ideas of improvement as well as his conception of himself as a moral agent in a world of moral possibility. Simone Weil provides a similar version of a quietist waiting with . To an ungenerous "active searching" she opposes a fundamental generosity, a "waiting or attentive and faithful immobility" through which one is able to recognize "that the sufferer exists." For Weil, as for Melville, there is no passage from such a recognition to a conception of history as progress. The sufferer is not a problem to be solved within a narrative of social improvement but the source of an unlimited and impossible obligation.

Abstract: The question posed in this article is whether Catholics can fully, unreservedly, and conscientiously carry out their duties as citizens and as holders of their various public offices (legislative, judicial and executive) of the State, in accordance with the laws and constitution of the democratic and pluralist States in which they live. My concern—as a practicing Catholic and a practicing lawyer—is that the increasingly fierce Church criticism, which arose during the papacy of John Paul II and now of Benedict XVI, of the perceived trend towards secularization in the social and political mores of Western (particularly European) democracies, and the greater readiness by Church officials to take it upon themselves explicitly to instruct the laity in political matters, puts this whole issue again into question. Should the bishops of the Catholic Church be seeking to use their ecclesiastical authority (over the faithful) to oppose or promote changes in the laws which apply to all within our society and/or to influence the way we might vote or carry out civic duties? This is a big and complex area involving the interplay of politics and theology; of private and public morality. It touches on the role of teaching office of the Catholic Church and the assent (and possibility of dissent) on the part of the faithful. It takes in questions of conscientious objection and unjust laws. It concerns individual conscience and the hope of salvation. It is about voting as sinning. It is about judging, and being judged.

Abstract: This guest column amounts to a conversation between two of the crucial figures in the world of Soviet bloc dissidents about developments in their part of the world since the overthrow of communism there in 1989 They agree that a “creeping coup d’etat” is underway, in which not only the government administrations of their countries have changed, but also their systems of governance—for the worse “It is not,” they agree, “what the democratic opposition spent twenty-five years fighting for” Their apprehension is that, under new forms, the old authoritarian impulses are returning to East-Central Europe as well as Russia

Abstract: Written exclusively in the third-person by a narrator who repeatedly refers to “Henry Adams” as “passive,” “submissive,” and “a helpless victim” in relation to the “forces” in the world that form him, The Education of Henry Adams attenuates both author and subject by valuing environment over eponym. The critical literature on the text has focused primarily on the formal or psychological bases of such practice in order to argue that Adams is behind, and thus exempt from, the book’s paradoxical self-effacements. But for Adams the rationale for the impersonal, evacuated form of The Education is more ontological than personal, the necessary consequence of his quietistic belief in a materialist determinism so absolute as to reduce persons and history alike to “sum[s]. . . . of the forces” of “nature.” This belief, one shared by many of his contemporaries and most fully evolved in Adams’s “dynamic theory of history,” entails, in the context of The Education , making the distinction between auto-biography and autobiography, between a text generated by an “automaton” and one written by a person. Routed through a discussion of de Man’s and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of irony, this essay explores the relevance of such a distinction to both the humanism of Adams’s age and the posthumanism of our own.

Abstract: Tolstoy writes in a letter to his friend A. A. Fet that what he as written in War and Peace , “especially in the epilogue,” is also said by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation. Tolstoy adds, however, that Schopenhauer approaches “it from the other side.” Schopenhauer does indeed say much the same thing as Tolstoy says in his epilogue and elsewhere about history and the will. Each of these authors argues that history is not progressing and that it is not governed by the actions of individual political or military leaders alone, but by the infinitely many actions of the multitude of people. What underlies this critique of history in each case is a quietist outlook on life, a perspective from which one must abandon the assertion of the will and accept life as it is given. Tolstoy’s quietism, however, is a happy quietism; he wants his reader to joyfully embrace life for all that it has to offer. Schopenhauer’s is an unhappy quietism; he wants his reader to accept life in the face of all that it is not. Thus, Tolstoy and Schopenhauer approach quietism, and consequently their critiques of history and the will, from different “sides.” These sides—to borrow Wittgenstein’s way of speaking—are the sides of the happy and the unhappy. To approach quietism from one side rather than another is no small matter. In Tolstoy’s case in particular, it made all the difference in the world.

Abstract: In one sense of the term current among analytical philosophers, the quietist lacks skeptical doubts about the metaphysical or epistemological status of ethical judgments as a class of judgment. He may still have doubts about, say, the current state of morality. There are criteria of courage by which, though they are open-ended, a man may count as acting bravely. It need not follow that he has adopted the best tactics. Yet he must have responded fittingly to danger. But how is that to be identified? “Ought”-judgments are to be understood contextually, with an implicit relativity to certain ends or quasi-ends, and—when the “ought” is only pro tanto —to certain aspects of, or opportunities within, a situation. These judgments are often intuitive in that they do not derive from the application of a principle. Fittingness is an anthropocentric relation that holds within some human perspective; we should not think of it as a feature purportedly inherent in the very nature of things. It is salutary to remember cases where the “ought” is so relativized, say to an undesirable end, that it identifies no reason for action. The nature of the relation does not change when it is relativized to an end that the agent has reason to achieve. “Ought”-judgments should not be interpreted in ambitious ways that make them generally problematic.

Abstract: Although they have a religious origin, the terms quietist and quietism have generally been used in the anglophone world in the context created by the French Revolution, which made them expressions of political abuse Examination of classic instances of their use shows that in fact they were terms of psychological abuse, signs that men and women of political commitment could not understand, let alone accept, others who were not committed to one side or other in the revolutionary struggle This paper takes issue with the egregious simplicity of that that attitude, while exploring aspects of the Idealist tradition in German philosophy which, also emerging from the challenge of the French Revolution, found positive terms and complex human explanations for behaviour that held back from definite political commitment It concludes by suggesting the terms quietist and quietism have become redundant in a world that has moved on from a crude clash of revolution versus reaction

Abstract: This essay, which is the editor's introduction to part 1 of a multipart symposium on quietism, also constitutes his call for symposium papers. The symposium is meant be comprehensive. It is described as political and broadly cultural as well as religious, and in religious terms is said to cover not only the Catholic and Protestant quietisms (most properly so called) of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also the proto-quietisms of the medieval Western church and reputedly quietist aspects of the Gnostic, Eastern Orthodox, early Hasidic, Shi'ite, Jain and other Indic, Taoist, and Zen religious traditions. This introduction emphasizes the secular approaches, mostly antipolitical or postphilosophical, that wear the adjective "quietist" metaphorically, including the postmodern currents that Martha Nussbaum has named "hip quietism" and the "minimalist" philosophical version developed by Wittgenstein and some of his successors, notably Richard Rorty. This introduction concludes with attention to Rorty's late essay "Naturalism and Quietism," then with a dedication of the entire symposium to Rorty's memory.

Abstract: In a dialogue whose precedents include Oscar Wilde’s “Critic as Artist,” two fictional professors of English take up the relationship between aestheticism and quietism. Their conversation begins with a debate on the necessity of treating sociopolitical contexts when teaching literature then moves to connections among aesthetic experience, political disengagement, inactivity, and contemplation explored by Wilde, Miguel de Molinos, Aristotle, Hannah Arendt, Walter Pater, Arthur Schopenhauer, Johann Winckelmann, and others. Having described the influence of nineteenth-century science and determinism on Wilde’s gospel of inaction, as well as Pater’s adaptation of the Winckelmannian view that people and things express their nature most truly when still, one speaker wonders whether aesthetic experience gains some of its significance from its affiliation with leisure. The other resists the idea that repose might constitute one of life’s key desiderata, but notes at the close how both his own view and his interlocutor’s are adumbrated in the Wallace Stevens poem that furnishes the dialogue its title.

Abstract: Quietists aim to bring something to rest, to move it from activity to quiescence. This essay depicts and advocates a quietism of political interest, which is to say a divorce of political action from interest in the outcome of such action. Its principal interlocutor is Pascal, whose 1657 letter to Perier argues, on theological and epistemological grounds, for exactly such a separation. The essay argues that a quietism of political interest has several advantages over ordinary consequentialist political advocacy and action, the most important among which is that the former can acknowledge that in a complex political system we are ordinarily unable to predict the results of enacting what we advocate, while the latter must occlude that fact. Quietists of political interest must replace concern with outcome by something else as a motive or cause for political advocacy and action; and while there are many possibilities here, in the West the only lively form of such quietism has been Christian-theological, in which political advocacy and action are, ideal-typically and sometimes actually, undertaken under the threefold assumption that: (1) advocacy of a political proposal assumes that justice in the political sphere is not attainable but must nonetheless be sought; (2) advocacy of a political proposal assumes that while Christian advocates can act unjustly, they cannot suffer injustice; and (3) advocacy of a political proposal proceeds always without concern for the outcome.

Abstract: This essay introduces the second installment of a symposium in Common Knowledge called “Apology for Quietism.” This introductory piece concerns the sociology of quietism and why, given the supposed quietude of quietists, there is such a thing at all. Dealing first with the “activist” Susan Sontag’s attraction to the “quietist” Simone Weil, it then concentrates on the “activist” William Empson’s attraction to the Buddha and to Buddhist quietism, with special reference to Empson’s lost manuscript Asymmetry in Buddha Faces (and to Sharon Cameron’s work on the topic in her book Impersonality ). The author, who is also editor of the journal, argues against the effort of some contributors to substitute new terms for quietism and emphasizes instead what he calls (quoting Sontag) “the need for repose.”