problems in addition to the signs of the Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome. Many of the patients were closely examined over long periods and the authors make the point that repeated examinations for as long as ten years in some instances allowed them to describe the natural history of the syndrome. and this they do in their third chapter. Again the description of the pathological findings is precise and comprehensive and the authors stress the periventricular distribution of the lesions and their bilateral symmetry. The authors consider specifically the neuropathological substrate on which are based the defective memory, ocular motor signs, the ataxia, the global confusional state and the occasional disturbance of olfactory and gustatory function. They argue a unity between Wernicke's disease and Korsakoff's psychosis and discuss the relationship between these two and alcoholic cerebellar degeneration, central pontine myelinolysis and other myelinolytic syndromes and interestingly discuss the problem of \"alcoholic dementia\" concluding that the nosological status ofalcoholic dementia is by

https://jnnp.bmj.com/content/jnnp/52/10/1218.2.full.pdf

Neuropsychology Mental Structure

A clutch of '-isms' characterises the approach to consciousness which David Chalmers defends: dualism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, anti-reductionism, and -probably -panpsychism. (The author would no doubt want 'naturalism' included in the list as well, but as we shall see, Chalmers' predilection to describe his theory as 'scientific' stretches credibility.) While the book does not, as far as I can see, move consciousness research significantly forward, Chalmers succeeds admirably in clarifying the philosophical terrain around and within each of these '-isms' and in questioning the usual assumptions which suggest some of them are mutually exclusive. Because nearly all of what follows is highly critical, I want to be explicit about one thing: I do not think this is a bad book. Throughout, most discussions keep to a very high standard; it's just that they include fatal flaws.

The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory

Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension.

Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 “Conscious” and “Consciousness” ..................................................................................... 1 “Self-conscious” and “Self-consciousness” ....................................................................... 3 Degrees of Being Conscious ............................................................................................... 4 Consciousness and Self-consciousness ............................................................................. 6 Intentionality ...................................................................................................................... 7 Experience .......................................................................................................................... 7 Who is Conscious? ............................................................................................................. 8 References ........................................................................................................................... 9 Revision History ................................................................................................................. 9

Consciousness and Experience

https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1803&context=faithandphilosophy

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory

Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, where Dennett's distinction has been presumed to be equivalent to Stephen Stich's distinction between doxastic and subdoxastic states. Both these interpretations of the personal/subpersonal distinction, and also Dennett's own philosophical views of the mind, go beyond the personal/subpersonal distinction itself. They each involve supplementing the distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations with metaphysical claims about the relationship between the two kinds of explanation and the entities they posit.

/pdf/the-personal-subpersonal-distinction-11ukkcqbzo.pdf

The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction

/pdf/the-uses-and-abuses-of-the-personal-subpersonal-distinction-4xfozhn2ea.pdf

The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction

The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This ‘embodied’ trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional ‘mind-ascomputer’ approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, I look at the current relationship between orthodox cognitive science and the study of mental disorder, and consider the implications that the embodied trend could have for issues in psychopathology.

/pdf/embodied-cognitive-science-and-its-implications-for-2zlrzu8hq8.pdf

Embodied Cognitive Science and Its Implications for Psychopathology

Fictionalists propose that some apparently fact-stating discourses do not aim to convey factual information about the world, but rather allow us to engage in a fiction or pretence without incurring ontological commitments. Some philosophers have suggested that using mathematical, modal, or moral discourse, for example, need not commit us to the existence of mathematical objects, possible worlds, or moral facts. The mental fictionalist applies this reasoning to our mental discourse, suggesting that we can use “belief” and “desire” talk without committing to the existence of beliefs and desires as mental entities. Most arguments for mental fictionalism are based on two key suppositions: first, that there are ontological concerns about mental entities; and second, that these ontological concerns justify a fictionalist interpretation of mental discourse. This paper challenges both suppositions and argues that the standard arguments for mental fictionalism are substantially weaker than arguments for other forms of fictionalism in the philosophical literature. 

/pdf/what-we-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-mental-states-1-pzcnduhj.pdf

What we talk about when we talk about mental states 1

The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience. This ‘phenomenal’ aspect of consciousness seems to be subjective, private, and knowable in a special way, making it difficult to reconcile with the scientific focus on objective, third-person data. This introduction provides an overview of phenomenal consciousness, explores philosophical arguments about its nature, and considers whether or not we should expect to find an explanation for the properties of phenomenal consciousness.

/pdf/the-philosophy-of-phenomenal-consciousness-an-introduction-3w2go4moh5.pdf

The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness: An introduction.

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