Zehao Dou
Yale University
13 Papers
47 Citations
Zehao Dou is an academic researcher from Yale University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Generator (mathematics) & Computer science. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 10 publications. Previous affiliations of Zehao Dou include Peking University.
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Papers
Improving Word Embeddings for Antonym Detection Using Thesauri and SentiWordNet
Zehao Dou,Wei Wei,Xiaojun Wan +2 more
- 26 Aug 2018
TL;DR: To generate word embeddings that are capable of detecting antonyms, the objective function of Skip-Gram model is modified, and the supervised synonym and antonym information in thesauri as well as the sentiment information of each word in SentiWordNet are utilized.
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Mathematical Analysis of Adversarial Attacks
Zehao Dou,Stanley Osher,Bao Wang +2 more
TL;DR: It is proved that, within a certain regime, the untargetedFGSM can fool any convolutional neural nets (CNNs) with ReLU activation; the targeted FGSM can mislead any CNNs with Re LU activation to classify any given image into any prescribed class.
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When can Wasserstein GANs minimize Wasserstein Distance
Yuanzhi Li,Zehao Dou +1 more
- 09 Mar 2020
TL;DR: It is shown that when the generator is a class of two-layer neural networks, then it is necessary and sufficient for the discriminator to be a one-layer network with ReLU-type activation functions, and when the training stops, the generator will indeed output a distribution that is inverse-polynomially close to the target.
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Making Method of Moments Great Again? -- How can GANs learn distributions
Yuanzhi Li,Zehao Dou +1 more
TL;DR: Only by matching these empirical moments over polynomially many training examples, it is proved that the generator can already learn notable class of distributions, including those that can be generated by two-layer neural networks.
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Finding Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium for Continuous Games through Deep Learning
TL;DR: This paper presents a new method to approximate mixed strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player continuous games, which always exist and include the pure ones as a special case, and consistently and significantly outperforms recent works on approximating Nash equilibrium.