Yongxin Xu
Monash University
7 Papers
3 Citations
Yongxin Xu is an academic researcher from Monash University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Shareholder. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 6 publications. Previous affiliations of Yongxin Xu include Victoria University of Wellington & Southwestern University of Finance and Economics.
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Papers
The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance
TL;DR: The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges as discussed by the authors.
Internet searching and stock price crash risk: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment
TL;DR: In this paper, the stock price crash risk for firms searched for more via Google before its withdrawal subsequently increases by 19%, suggesting that Internet searching facilitates investors' information processing, and the sensitivity of stock returns to negative Internet posts also rises by 36%.
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Anticorruption regulation and firm value: Evidence from a shock of mandated resignation of directors in China
TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors showed that the anticorruption regulation impedes firm value not only through political connections but also through the antic-corruption disincentive, the incentive to act passively for fear of being accused of corruption.
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Subsidiary Governance and Corporate Tax Planning: The Effect of Parent-Subsidiary Common Directors and Officers
TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper study the role of subsidiary governance in general and common D&O in particular in corporate tax-planning and find that the tax-saving effect is stronger for firms with more intangible assets and with related-party transactions involving subsidiaries.
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Liquidity and Large Shareholder Monitoring
TL;DR: This article found that board members representing large shareholders become less busy and more diligent, while busyness and diligence of independent directors are not affected by liquidity, and large shareholders also improve compensation contracts by increasing pay-performance sensitivity.
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