Preface Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government Joseph S. Nye, Jr. PART ONE: The Scope and Performance of Government The Evolving Scope of Government Ernest R. May Measuring the Performance of Government Derek Bok Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government Gary Orren PART TWO: The Menu of Explanations Is It Really the Economy Stupid? Robert Z. Lawrence Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with U.S. Government Jane Manbridge The Polarization of American Parties and Mistrust of Government David C. King The Politics of Mistrust Richard E. Neustadt PART THREE: Data on Public Attitudes toward Governance Changing Attitudes in America Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, Richard Morin, Drew E. Altman, Mollyann Brodie, Mario Brossard, And Matt James Postmaterialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority Ronald Inglehart Public Trust and Democracy in Japan Susan J. Pharr Conclusion: Reflections, Conjectures, and Puzzles Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Philip D. Zelikow Notes Contributors Index

Why people don't trust government

The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929 by Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Mauerer

Do informal institutions, rules, and norms created and enforced by social groups promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the article, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055415000155

Informal Institutions, Collective Action, and Public Investment in Rural China

Purpose – Cases of corruption, embezzlement, theft and fraud, abuse of discretion, favoritism, nepotism, clientelism, and abuse of power in governments have led to a growing demand from society to access public information. In response to this demand, governments have been forced to be more transparent in the conduct of their activities. The information transparency index (TI) may be conditioned by economic and political characteristics of local governments affecting the information provided. What factors influenced the index of municipal transparency? Literature about transparency is largely based on the explanations of the agency theory and the legitimacy theory. Based on the postulates of both theories, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, study the index transparency in Spanish municipalities, and, second, determine the main features that are affecting the index of transparency. Design/methodology/approach – Data were collected from Transparency International Spain ranking and from official so...

Local government transparency index: determinants of municipalities’ rankings

Do informal institutions, rules and norms created and enforced by social groups, promote good local governance in environments of weak democratic or bureaucratic institutions? This question is difficult to answer because of challenges in defining and measuring informal institutions and identifying their causal effects. In the paper, we investigate the effect of lineage groups, one of the most important vehicles of informal institutions in rural China, on local public goods expenditure. Using a panel dataset of 220 Chinese villages from 1986 to 2005, we find that village leaders from the two largest family clans in a village increased local public investment considerably. This association is stronger when the clans appeared to be more cohesive. We also find that clans helped local leaders overcome the collective action problem of financing public goods, but there is little evidence suggesting that they held local leaders accountable.

Villagers' committee elections in Chinese rural areas highlight the promise as well as the challenge of democratization in a one-party state. Why are there huge regional variations in terms of voter turnout rate? Based on a large survey conducted in 2005, we argue that electoral procedures have played a crucial role in signaling the democratic intent of local governments. Villagers were more responsive to more meaningful elections with higher-quality electoral procedures. In addition, competitive politics has reactivated traditional social ties and networks in village lives, which have mobilized villagers to voting stations. The results are robust to endogeneity tests and other model specifications. These empirical findings highlight electoral dynamics that are common in many transitional democracies. They also imply some major challenges facing China's rural democracy.

Clans, Electoral Procedures and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Villagers' Committee Elections in Transitional China:

Political trust as rational belief: Evidence from Chinese village elections

How do authoritarian elections affect voters’ attitudes toward the regime and their support for democracy? This article draws upon the case of village elections in China to argue that elections may have two simultaneous effects. First, free and fair elections increase citizens’ confidence in the government. Second, elections also allow voters to exercise political rights and accumulate democratic experience through participation, and this in turn may trigger greater demand for further empowerment. Empirical analysis of data from a two-round nationwide survey conducted in 114 villages confirms both effects. One implication of these findings is that competitive elections may simultaneously boost regime popularity and increase public demand for further democratic reform.

/pdf/autocrats-dilemma-the-dual-impacts-of-village-elections-on-2yuj77jwbx.pdf

Autocrats’ Dilemma: The Dual Impacts of Village Elections on Public Opinion in China

Politically motivated interference by politicians, or “politicised enforcement”, is a common cause of enforcement failure in many countries. Existing research on politicised enforcement has focused largely on incentives driven by electoral competition, while fewer studies analysed its mechanisms in an authoritarian context. Drawing on the case of China, this article develops the argument that politicised enforcement can be a consequence of the strategies adopted by authoritarian ruling elites to maintain political survival. Using a panel data set on the enforcement of land laws and regulations, the empirical analysis suggests that the intensity of enforcement correlates with economic performance and patron–client ties between central leaders and local officials, suggesting that political imperatives faced by ruling elites to promote economic growth and carry out clientelistic exchanges affect government decisions on enforcement. Moreover, these correlations remain robust after the implementation of reforms that promoted administrative centralisation within the enforcement agency, suggesting that politicised enforcement reflects the strategic behaviour of the ruling elites of the Party. These findings contribute to the literature on enforcement in authoritarian regimes broadly and in China specifically.

/pdf/politicised-enforcement-in-china-evidence-from-the-11cgqjz7ux.pdf

Politicised Enforcement in China: Evidence from the Enforcement of Land Laws and Regulations

Land Institution Reform Under Xi: Policy Changes and Implications

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