Xi Lu

TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors showed that although many of the corrupt officials are connected, Xi's most prominent political opponent, Bo Xilai, is less central by any network measure than other officials who were not viewed as challenging Xi's leadership.

TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors developed a rational model to explain villagers' participation in village elections and highlighted the pivotal role of township governments in China's rural politics and reveal the inner dilemma of democratization in China.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that China's grain procurement system as a major instrument in rural taxation survived the communes and lost its importance only gradually in recent years, and that traditional tax instruments of "tax deduction prior to grain procurement payment" and implicit taxation through "price scissors" gradually eroded.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explain the regional variation in the electoral rules governing village election in China and argue that China's fast urbanization and land development have undermined the quality of village election.