Stuart C. Gilson
Harvard University
54 Papers
456 Citations
Stuart C. Gilson is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Bankruptcy & Restructuring. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 54 publications. Previous affiliations of Stuart C. Gilson include University of Texas at Austin.
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Papers
Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied 111 publicly traded firms that either file for bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt between 1979 and 1985 and found that corporate default leads to significant changes in the ownership of firms' residual claims and in the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources.
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Troubled debt restructurings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the incentives of financially distressed firms to restructure their debt privately rather than through formal bankruptcy, and find that firms more likely to reduce their debt have more intangible assets, owe more debt to banks, and owe fewer lenders.
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Management turnover and financial distress
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated senior management turnover in financially distressed firms and found that 52% of managers experience turnover if their firms are either in default on their debt, bankrupt, or privately restructuring their debt to avoid bankruptcy.
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CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987, and found that almost one third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions.
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Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the impact of transactions costs on leverage choices by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court and show that transactions costs are much higher when debt is restructured out-of-court.
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